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Chapter 1: Introduction
“As it is fundamental to the social, economic, and environmental sustainability of
every community and every political economy, water is a strategic resource.”
–J.A. Allen, “Water Security in the Middle East: The Hydro-Politics of Global Solutions”

In 1991, soon before Boutros Boutros Ghali became Secretary General of the United
Nations, he famously proclaimed, “the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not
politics.”1 Although oil and Islamic sect differences beat water to the punch, Ghali’s
comment represents an acknowledgement of the growing importance of water in
international political and economic discourses worldwide. Today, the price of a bottle of
water exceeds the spot price of oil, reflecting a coming age of unprecedented liquid scarcity.2
Water is unlike any other natural resource. It is simultaneously a fundamental human
right and a critical economic input. It has no substitutes and often transcends national
boundaries, imbuing it with immense value and the potential for use as a potent weapon in its
insufficiency. In May 2014, the United Nations declared water a “weapon of war in military
conflicts.”3 4,500 years ago, Mesopotamian city-states Umma and Lagesh fought the only
known war exclusively over water for control of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the
marshlands of the Fertile Crescent (present day southern Iraq).4 Since then, while armed
conflict over water has been avoided, disputing claims and tension among states over control
of, and access to, water resources are by no means unusual. The United States and Mexico
have squabbled over the Rio Grande and the Colorado, India and Pakistan for the Indus, and
Egypt and Ethiopia along the Nile.5 However, as if the landscape remembers the blood that

1

Adams, Water and Security Policy: The Case of Turkey, 1.
Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis, xii.
Deen, “U.N. Decries Water as Weapon of War in Military Conflicts.”
4
Grover, Water: A Source of Conflict or Cooperation?, 7.
5
Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis, xii–xiii.
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ran next to the water 4,500 years ago, it is in the arid Middle East that tempers run highest
over transboundary water resources.
In a region already fraught with political and religious tumult, water seems more
often to inspire predictions of dispute than extinguish them. In a 2013 Strategic Foresight
Group study on worldwide water cooperation, the Middle East demonstrated the lowest trust
and political will for cooperation among co-riparians, most systematic exclusion of one or
more riparian state in negotiations, the least active cooperation, and, where treaties exist,
least satisfactory mechanisms for dispute resolution.6 Among the international river basins of
the Middle East, the Tigris-Euphrates, shared among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria is perhaps most
cited as a hot spot for potential total water war.7
The Tigris-Euphrates Basin is an interesting case as, unlike other water basins in the
Middle East, it has historically had more than adequate water resources to support the
populations of its three riparians.8 Yet it has been subject to equal, if not more, tension,
dispute, and low-level conflict than many of the world’s other arid basins.9 In this project, I
examine the tensions and disputes among the Tigris-Euphrates riparians over the Twin
Rivers, their origins, changes over time, and the potential for conflict versus cooperation in
the future. I argue that water was a low politics, cooperative issue between the end of the
First World War and the early 1960s, the subject of conflictual high politics interactions
between 1960 and the turn of the century, and from 2000-2010 remained in high politics but
became the object of more collaborative engagement. I assert that the perception of scarcity
and actual shortages serve to drive water from low to high politics and that the oscillation

6

Strategic Foresight Group, Water Cooperation for a Secure World: Focus on the Middle East, 41, 48, 63, 82.
Starr, “Water Wars”; Elhance, Hydorpolitics in the third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins; Barkey, Reluctant Neighbor:
Turkey’s Role in the Middle East.
8
Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex,” 105; Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 117–118; Sowers,
Vengosh, and Weinthal, “Climte Change, Water Resources, and the Politics of Adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa,” 606–607.
9
Strategic Foresight Group, Water Cooperation for a Secure World: Focus on the Middle East.
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from cooperative hydropolitics to conflictual and back follows the ebb and flow of wider
politics dictated by diplomatic relations, influence of external actors, economic ties, and the
saliency of ethnic and ideological similarities and differences. In this way, I show that water
politics follow the pattern of overall bilateral and trilateral relations among the three riparian
states.
This introductory chapter will outline the relevant literatures and theories relating to
water conflict and cooperation and introduce my research question and analytical framework.
The second chapter divides the history of the Tigris-Euphrates into three time periods and
closely follows hydropolitics as they change among the riparians over time. The third chapter
analyzes the change over time illustrated during chapter two and endeavors to explain why
water politics have fluctuated in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. The conclusion briefly applies
my analytical framework to the events of present day and considers potential forms water
politics may take in the basin in the future.
Literature Review
In a world of rapidly expanding population, growing consumption, and changing
environment, questions about how environmental systems interact with issues of security,
politics, economics, and social change are becoming increasingly pressing. Of particular
interest is the question of how environmental changes, including depletion and degradation,
may influence security. The field of environmental security has emerged to study the way
that resources and the environment relate to security concerns and interactions among states.
The most pressing question within this issue area is: are environmental changes and resource
scarcity, degradation, and depletion more likely to stimulate conflict among affected actors or
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encourage cooperation? The following literature review discusses how scholars have
attempted to answer this critical question.
Conflict and Cooperation: Definitions
Throughout the scholarly literature, the uses and meaning of the terms “conflict” and
“cooperation” are ambiguous and varied. They are both broad and multifaceted concepts that
authors rarely define explicitly. I define the terms generally here, and utilize them throughout
the literature review that follows as they are interpreted and employed by the scholars I
discuss.
Drawing from Frey (1993) and Uitto and Wolf (2002) conflict occurs among “two or
more entities, one or more of which perceives a goal as being blocked by another entity,
[when] power of some sort [is] exerted to overcome the perceived blockage.”10 Conflict most
often arises from competition and is associated with negative forms of interaction.11 As
Grover (2007) discusses, conflict can be based on economic, social, political, and
institutional blockages.12 Although the term is most often used to describe instances of
violence, it also includes nonviolent or less organized violent engagement, such as social
protest.13 Sosland (2007) suggests that conflict arises as a result of three different types of
stimuli: deep, intermediate, and precipitating.14 Precipitating causes occur immediately
before the onset of conflict; intermediate causes occur farther in time from the onset of
conflict and may include a series of controversial events or an ongoing issue of dispute; and
deep causes include historical points of contention and underlying prejudices.15

10

Frey, “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins,” 57; Uitto and Wolf, “Water Wars? Geographcal Perspectives:
Introduction,” 289.
11
Grover, Water: A Source of Conflict or Cooperation?, 3–4.
12
Ibid., 3.
13
Dabelko, “An Uncommon Peace: Environment, Development, and the Global Security Agenda,” 250.
14
Sosland, Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin, 5.
15
Ibid.
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Throughout the relevant literature, the term “cooperation” is also similarly used to
describe a range of interactions among actors. According to Frey (1993), cooperation
constitutes, “working together for common benefits …[and] implies coordination of behavior
among actors to realize at least some common goals.”16 In contrast to conflict as a form of
negative engagement, cooperation is generally regarded as a positive form of interaction.
Cooperation among state or non-state actors ranges from “informal contact for consultation
and information exchange” to treaties or codified legal agreements to joint ventures and
authorities.17 These broad definitions drawn from the literature help to frame the forthcoming
discussion of the theories of environmental conflict and cooperation.
Environmental Warmongers: The Resource Conflict Thesis
In recent years, world leaders, scientific experts, and scholars alike have expressed
the concern that the earth’s finite resources will be at the heart of the 21st century’s conflicts.
In 1987, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development published
the Our Common Future report, widely regarded as the seminal work on environmental
security. The report asserts, “Environmental stress is both a cause and an effect of political
tension and military conflict. Nations have often fought to assert or resist control over raw
materials, energy supplies, land, river basins, sea passages, and other key environmental
resources. Such conflicts are likely to increase as these resources become scarcer and
competition for them increases.”18 In support of such conclusions, numerous scholars concur
that resources can serve as direct or indirect causes of violent conflict.

16
17
18

Frey, “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins,” 57.
Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 8–9.
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 290.
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Scholars argue that resources are often the direct cause of conflict when they are
scarce. In such a “simple-scarcity” conflict,19 under conditions of a finite resource
endowment, “conflict may arise between states over access to vital sources of supply, and
within states over the distribution of the limited materials available.”20 Similarly, “Even in
the absence of debilitating scarcities, conflict among states may arise from the belligerent,
resource-expansionist claims of one or more states.”21 Simple-scarcity conflict most often
applies non-renewable resources, such as minerals and oil.22 The 1991 Gulf War is an oftencited example of a “simple-scarcity” conflict motivated by the desire to gain control of oil
reserves.23
The environmental security literature also suggests that resources provide an indirect
causal pathway to conflict. Günther Bächler and Thomas Homer-Dixon argue that, by
causing or contributing to economic decline, migration, demographic pressure, or state
weakness, environmental transformations (i.e. resource depletion, scarcity, and degradation)
can exacerbate existing ethnic, social, political, or economic divisions within society and
result in upheaval.24 According to Bächler, “Violent conflicts triggered by the environment
due to degradation of renewable resources (water, land, forest, vegetation) generally manifest
themselves in socioeconomic crisis regions of developing and transitional societies if and
when social fault lines can be manipulated by actors in struggles over social, ethnic, political,
and international power.”25 Environmental and resource degradation or scarcity can thus act
as a “threat multiplier.” 26 Changes in a resource stock or environmental quality “are stressors
19

Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 18.
Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, 20.
Elhance, Hydorpolitics in the third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, 4.
22
Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 19.
23
Ibid., 18.
24
Bächler, “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis”; Bächler, Violence Through Environmental Discrimination, xvi; Homer-Dixon,
“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 32.
25
Bächler, “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis,” 25.
26
Johnstone and Mazo, “Global Climate Change and the Arab Spring,” 11–17; European Commission, Climate Change and International Security, 2; United
States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 84.
20
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that can ignite a volatile mix of underlying causes that erupt into revolution”27 or violent
conflict. Stresses caused by resource scarcities, inequities in access, or environmental
degradation can provide an additional grievance for an already aggrieved group that may tip
the scale towards conflict. Thus, as an indirect cause or threat multiplier, a resource or
environmental condition may not provide the root cause of conflict, but rather acts as either
an intermediary or the decisive factor that transforms other sociopolitical divisions or
grievances into conflict or revolution. Recent work has suggested that the Arab Spring
revolutions that shook the Middle East beginning in 2011 were partially attributable to
droughts that impacted food prices and supply, providing the added stress necessary to
transform deep political grievances into violent uprising.28 Thus, while the precise
mechanisms vary, the above-discussed authors largely concur that environmental change and
scarcity can and will play an increasingly critical causal role in the conflicts of the 21st
century.
Resource Peace Advocates
In opposition to those who argue that the environment will serve as a source of
conflict in years to come are those who argue that states, communities, and individuals are
far more likely to cooperate over shared resources than they are to conflict. These theorists
can be divided into three categories: 1) scarcity skeptics; 2) non-conflict theorists; and 3)
environmental cooperation scholars.
While environmental conflict scholars take environmental change and eventual
scarcity as a given, scarcity skeptics question the very idea that resource scarcity will a) ever
exist, or b) come to be a cause for conflict. Economist Julian Simon forwards the argument

27

Slaughter, “Preface,” 1.
Johnstone and Mazo, “Global Climate Change and the Arab Spring”; Werrell and Femia, “The Arab Spring and Climate Change: A Climate and Security
Correlations Series.”
28
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that population growth does not necessarily create pressure on finite resources.29 He posits
that, in the long run, human ingenuity and market forces allow for technological
advancements that can provide substitutes for nearly every natural resource supposedly
threatened by scarcity.30 Daniel Deudney critiques the environmental conflict thesis on
largely the same grounds. He argues that states will not war over resources because: 1) “the
robust character of the world trade system means that states no longer experience resource
dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy;” and 2) “the
world is entering…the ‘age of substitutability,’ in which industrial civilization is increasingly
capable of taking earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon and hydrocarbons…and
fashioning them into virtually everything needed.”31 Thus, these scholars suggest that
because human ingenuity and material substitutability will overcome scarcity and resource
degradation constraints, conflicts over resources are implausible.
Most environmental cooperation scholars acknowledge the existence of scarcity and
environmental change as a challenge for environmental management, but suggest that
conflict is not the rational response to such conditions. Jack Goldstone writes, “Where the
problem faced by two groups, or two nations, is over the degradation or depletion of an
environmental resource, war neither solves the problem (it cannot make more of the
resource), nor is it an economically efficient way to redistribute the resource (the costs of war
almost invariably far outweigh the cost of gaining alternative resources or paying more for a
share of the resource).”32 When a state or group fears it will soon face resource scarcity
because of the actions of another state or group, it is argued that the actor will take
anticipatory precautions to safeguard resource access in order to either prevent it from
29

Simon, The Ultimate Resource.
Ibid.; Simon, The Ultimate Resource 2.
Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 279.
32
Goldstone, “Demography, Environment, and Security,” 90.
30
31
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becoming a source of contention or keep it from being used as a form of coercion.33
Similarly, it is suggested that the modern state system is not conducive to resource conflict.
Deudney argues, “The prospects for resource wars are diminished, since states find it
increasingly difficult to exploit foreign resources through territorial conquest.” 34 Thus,
according to Erika Weinthal and Avner Vengosh, resources are more likely to create dispute
on the sub-national level, where they raise issues of development, quality, equity, and public
participation, rather than prompting violent interstate conflict.35 While newly formed, postSoviet states in Central Asia have cooperatively managed their shared rivers,36 intra-state
disputes about dam construction and displacement are commonplace, such as that in India’s
Narmada valley,37 supporting this viewpoint.
The most optimistic cooperation theorists assert that the need to manage
environmental degradation and depletion provides actors with an opportunity for
cooperation. Proponents of this view suggest that, “resource scarcity based on environmental
degradation tends to encourage joint efforts to halt such degradation…just as scarcity may
lead to conflict among states, it is often due to scarcity that states tend to cooperate.”38 The
inherent interdependences that arise when two or more actors share a resource create an
imperative for cooperation of some kind.39 Stressing the immense historical precedence of
environmental negotiations and agreements,40 Ken Conca, a leading theorist in the
environmental cooperation field, asserts that “environmental peacemaking goes far beyond
simply forestalling environmentally induced conflict…environmental cooperation can be an
effective general catalyst for reducing tensions, broadening cooperation, fostering
33

Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail,” viii.
Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 279.
Weinthal and Vengosh, “Water and Conflict: Moving from the Global to the Local,” 266–267.
36
Weinthal, From Environmental Peacemaking to Environmental Peacekeeping, 19.
37
Rajagopal, “The Violence of Development.”
38
Dinar, International Water Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation along Transboundary Rivers, 10–11.
39
Elhance, Hydorpolitics in the third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, 6, 14.
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demilitarization, and promoting peace.”41 According to Conca, there are two pathways
through which addressing environmental issues may encourage actors to cooperate: 1)
“changing the strategic climate,” which amounts to trust-building and lengthening timelines,
and 2) “strengthening post-Westphalian governance,” which entails creation of a shared
identity that renders conflict unthinkable.42 It is argued that Canada and the United States’
successful collaboration to overcome uncertainty and address acid rain43 enhanced the two
states’ overall relationship. While many scholars suggest that this particular thesis—that
environmental factors can actually lead to greater overall cooperation among states—requires
more research and empirical testing, all the above scholars form a consensus around the idea
that actors are far more likely to cooperate over scarce and changing environments than they
are to conflict.
Water Wars?
Erika Weinthal suggests that, whether intentionally or not, much of the environmental
conflict and cooperation literature either directly discusses water conflict/cooperation in
particular, or has water in mind when considering environmental and resource dynamics in
general.44 There is no doubt that water, as both a life necessity and critical economic driver,
is a powerful resource with the potential to both ignite dispute and inspire collaboration.
Shared river basins and transboundary rivers are the most commonly discussed water body in
environmental conflict and cooperation literature, as they create particularly interesting and
problematic dynamics among competing riparian states. The following sections will examine
the environmental conflict and cooperation theses as they pertain to water and transboundary
rivers in particular.
41

Conca, Environmental Peacemaking, 9.
Ibid., 10.
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When Does Water Scarcity Lead to Conflict?
Water is a beloved subject of resource conflict literature. According to Thomas
Homer-Dixon, water is the only renewable resource likely to be subject to simple-scarcity
conflicts,45 and Joyce Starr proclaims, “water security will soon rank with military security in
the war rooms of defense ministers.”46 The water wars thesis posits that, because
“international water [is] a critical, nonsubstitutable resource, which flows and fluctuates
across time and space, for which legal principles are vague and contradictory, and which is
becoming relatively more scarce with every quantum or growth in population or standards of
living,”47 the 21st century will be characterized by wars over water. To summarize, the fact
that water is important, maldistributed, shared, and increasingly scarce48 gives it the potential
to both directly and indirectly cause conflict.
In an effort to make this theoretical line of argument more nuanced, Peter Gleick has
identified five distinct ways in which water plays a role in conflict: 1) water inequities as the
root of conflict; 2) water condition as the root of conflict; 3) water or water systems as a
strategic political or military goal; 4) water or water systems as a strategic political or
military tool; and 5) water or water systems as a strategic military target. 49 Under type one,
individuals, groups, or entire countries may squabble over an unequal distribution of water,
as occurred in the 1970s in China when upstream villages made excess withdrawals from the
Zhang River, sparking downstream village militia attacks.50 Similar disputes may occur in
the context of type two conflict, whereby one actor is perceived as having polluted or
diminished the water quality faced by another. States or non-state actors employ type three
45

Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 19.
Starr, “Water Wars,” 19.
Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” 253.
48
Frey, “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins,” 54.
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Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 84–93; Gleick, “Environment and Security: The Clear Connections,” 19–20; Lonergan, “Water and Conflict: Rhetoric and
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water conflict when they attempt to gain control of another’s vital water resources or water
infrastructure. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has used such tactics, prioritizing
towns and infrastructure along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to rapidly gain control of inner
Syria and Iraq.51 Water can be used under type four as a coercive political or military tool by
an upstream state to gain concessions from a downstream actor, such as in 1997 when
Malaysia threatened to stop water flow to Singapore in retaliation for Singapore’s criticism
of Malaysian policies.52 Type five is perhaps the most common: dams, canals, irrigation
systems, and other water infrastructure are often targeted or attacked during conflict
otherwise unrelated to water. During World War II, Germany purposefully destroyed over
two thirds of Soviet hydroelectric systems in an attempt to weaken Soviet resistance.53
While it is clear that water and conflict have a complicated and varied relationship,
environmental conflict theorists certainly imbue water with the potential to make enemies of
neighboring individuals, groups, and states. As climate change alters the planet’s weather
dynamics, increasing precipitation in some regions, and starving others of rain, already
precious freshwater resources in shared basins are almost certain to become more scarce,
increasing the chances for those subscribing to the water wars thesis to see their theories
become reality.
The Proven Potential of Hydro-cooperation
Environmental cooperation theorists also put in their two cents about the possibility
of water wars. Scarcity skeptics like Bjorn Lomborg suggest, “the problem is not that there is
too little water, but that it is used poorly”54 and argue that correct water pricing, which would
drive more efficient use of the Earth’s finite water supply, would address perceived scarcity
51

Watkins and Yourish, “A Rogue State Along Two Rivers.”
Gleick, “Water Conflict Chronology List.”
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and reduce the likelihood of dispute. 55 J.A. Allan concurs with this hypothesis and suggests
that technological and societal changes, such as trade in “virtual water” (goods that are
water-intensive to produce, i.e. food), will keep scarcity at bay56 and thus eliminate any need
for conflict.
Though recognizing rising scarcity as a major challenge for water management, other
scholars suggest the implausibility of water wars based on the preeminence of other issues in
foreign policy. Jon Barnett writes, “if there is a conflict over water, then that conflict is the
result of failure of politics to negotiate a settlement over the shared use of water. The idea
that a war over water, or any other resource, is not a war about politics is dubious.”57
Similarly, Aaron Wolf makes three arguments against the likelihood of water conflict on the
bases of 1) strategic interests; 2) shared interests; and 3) institutional resiliency.58 His
strategic interest argument states that the high costs and nebulous goals of a water war would
rarely, if ever, be in the strategic interest of a state—upstream or downstream.59 Wolf’s
shared interests approach argues that, whether it be for flood control, agricultural
development, or mutual use of a boundary river, the very existence of a transboundary
waterway creates interdependences and shared interests that disincentivize conflict.60 Finally,
Wolf’s institutional resiliency argument suggests that efforts to cooperatively manage water
are cumulative: “once cooperative water regimes are established…they turn out to be
tremendously resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparians and even as
conflict is waged over other issues.”61
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Such theories have led scholars to characterize water as a likely candidate for “lowprofile”62 or “tactical functional”63 cooperation. According to Sosland,
States in a protracted conflict that are interdependent on an important functional issue, such as shared
water resources, may cooperate tactically…Over time, the process of two parties in a protracted
conflict meeting and discussing a divisive issue may lead to a change in a state’s preferences. A new
idea—positive personal relationship among technocrats and elites—and a new sense of trust and
confidence may move parties toward a common understanding of a problem and its solution.64

In such a way, Sosland, along with Dolatyar and Gray (2000), Conca (2001, 2002), Elhance
(1999), and Dinar (2008) hint at the possibility that joint action over water may eventually
lead otherwise conflictual states to cooperate, possibly not only on issues relating to water,
but beyond. An example of such cooperation is the Israel-Jordan “Picnic Table Talks.” In the
last 60 years, though the two states have moved in and out of political confrontation, the
water managers have continued low-profile meetings several times a year to jointly manage
their shared rivers.65 While some scholars are more optimistic than others—dreaming that
Jordan and Israel’s picnic talks can be recreated in river basins the world over—at the heart
of all water cooperation authors’ arguments is the assertion that active collaboration is more
likely than conflict over shared water resources.
Empirical Tests
The preceding hypotheses regarding the potential for environmental, and in particular
water, conflict have been the subject of cross-national empirical investigations worth
mentioning here. In an examination of the link between environmental degradation and
conflict, Wench Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen find that “countries suffering from
environmental degradation…are more prone to civil conflict”66 (emphasis added) and that
economic and political factors are more important than environmental ones in predicting the
62
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incidence of civil conflict.67 While Hauge and Ellingsen do not examine the relationship
between environmental factors and interstate conflict, their results do illustrate a link
between environmental conditions and violence. In a different vein, Hans Petter Wollebaek,
Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Hegre examine whether location on a shared river basin
makes a country more prone to interstate violence. Their results find that, indeed, “shared
river dyads have a higher frequency of dispute outbreak than contiguous dyads,”68 leading
them to conclude, “there is something to shared rivers as a source of conflict. Whether that
‘something’ is mainly water scarcity is not clear.”69 To lend some support for the water
cooperation theorists side of the argument, Aaron Wolf conducted an in-depth examination
of “cases of international conflict where armed exchange was threatened or took place over
water resources.” 70 Reaching the conclusion that no war has ever been fought over water,
Wolf suggests that the concept of a “water war” lacks any historical precedence.71 Thus,
while efforts have been made to definitively determine the answer to the question of whether
environmental conditions, specifically with regard to water, are more likely to provoke
conflict or cooperation, even historical and empirical analysis leaves the question open.
Empirical studies have made it clear that, to a certain extent, both theses are correct—water
can provoke dispute under some conditions, and cooperation under others. There is ample
room within the field to further specify what those conditions are that encourage cooperation
and which motivate conflict.
Under What Conditions?
None of the above scholars argues that the pure existence of water, or another
resource, results in either conflict or cooperation. Rather, they each suggest a wide variety of
67
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intervening variables that make either conflict or cooperation more likely in a given
circumstance. This section outlines those variables, answering the question: under what
conditions is conflict or cooperation over shared water more likely?
Scarcity
Scarcity, and especially that which is perceived as induced by another actor (as
opposed to the effects of growing populations or drought) can make conflict more likely. In
the words of Michael Klare, “However divided [or undivided] two states or societies may be
over matters of politics or religion, the likelihood of their engaging in mutual combat
becomes considerably greater when one side believes that its essential supply of water, food,
or energy is threatened by the other.”72 Scholars also make a distinction between “perceived”
and “real” scarcity, both of which are seen as having the potential to motivate conflict.73
Existing Political Context
The existing political relationship between the two states is said to have a potent
impact on the potential for conflict or cooperation. According to Sosland, “When riparians
are engaged in an extended cold war, strained political and military relations make
cooperation more difficult and outright conflict more probable.”74 Based on her analysis of
the Jordan River Basin, Miriam Lowi takes this reasoning a step further to suggest that as
long as a political conflict exists, a water dispute will not be resolved cooperatively.
According to Lowi, the prerequisite for cooperative water management is the resolution of
any and all protracted political conflicts.75 Thus, when two states have no protracted political
conflict, they are more likely to engage collaboratively over transboundary water
management.
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Historical Relations
States that have worked together historically, especially through joint management of
a security issue, are more likely to cooperate when it comes to water challenges. Sosland
writes, “states are more apt to have a cooperative strategy on functional issues if they have
already improved their relationship by working together to balance a common security
threat.”76 When states do not have a strong foundation of cooperation on other issues, water
becomes more likely to provide a source of conflict.
Interdependencies
It is also suggested that the degree of interdepence among states play a role in their
willingness to initiate conflict or pursue cooperation. High degrees of transnational contact
encourage cooperation.77 Jon Barnett writes, “Military action to secure resources is unlikely
given the interdependence among states in the global economy”78 and it is suggested that a
high degree of interdependency among states makes them more likely to give up some degree
of sovereignty.79 Conca highlights economic interdependence (i.e. high levels of trade) as
one of, if not the, most important form of interdependence for encouraging cooperation
among states that also share environmental challenges.80
Similarities Among States
Theorists also find the extent of similarity among states to be important in their
predisposal toward cooperation or conflict over water resources. Common language, shared
perceptions of the problem, similar uses of the river, and uses of the same technologies for
water management make a cooperative outcome more likely.81 Additionally, Wolf suggests
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that the thesis asserting that democracies do not go to war with each other also applies to
democratic states that share a river,82 thus implying that similarities in regime type may
engender cooperation among riparians.
Existing Ethnic and Ideological Divides
The ethnic and ideological makeup of a river basin can influence the likelihood of
conflict or cooperation. According to Conca, “Environmental problems are most combustible
when they exacerbate existing social tensions based on class, religion, or ethnicity. When
such tensions are triggered in the absence or weakness of social institutions that otherwise
could mediate disputes or in the context of ‘failing’ states, it is said, violent conflict may be
triggered or worsened.”83 Ethnic or religious divisions thus have the potential to encourage a
more negative, conflictual outcome in a riparian dispute.
Trust
Trust, whether it be among state leaders or technocrats, is a key prerequisite to
cooperation.84 It is argued that mistrust and uncertainty are characteristic of negative,
conflictual interactions.85 Thus, LeMarquand suggests that, “confidence must be felt between
neighbors before they are willing to commit treasured natural resources to interdependent
development and management”86 of shared resources.
Power Asymmetries
Applying hegemonic stability theory to river basins, Lowi suggests, “If the dominant
power in the basin will benefit from regional cooperation in water utilization, it will take the
lead in creating and maintaining a regime.”87 In theory, downstream states will be
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predisposed to cooperate because of their being at mercy to the upstream state, and therefore
a basin will be cooperative only if the upstream riparian elects to cooperate.88
Issue Linkage
In countries where a high level of conflict is common, riparians often link issues.
States create an “agreement with a neighbor for an international river scheme that the
neighbor wants [in order to] gain concessions for other bilateral issues.”89 While many
authors suggest this as an important method of forwarding cooperation, Sosland argues,
“when a state has a general preference toward violent conflict or even war…that preference
may be strategically linked to the water scarcity issue in an ideological and nationalistic
manner to create international discord.”90 Thus, while issue linkage is an important
bargaining technique for states and can encourage cooperation, the political and religious
context, and the exact issue water is linked to, matters and can make conflict more likely.
Existence of Common Patron or Influence of an External Actor
The scholarly literature suggests that, when a third party or external actor becomes
involved in a riparian dispute to mediate, whether it is an international organization, other
state, or NGO, the chances for cooperative resolution are generally higher. According to
Elhance, “sustained international initiatives and support are often needed to overcome the
many barriers to interstate cooperation in hydropolitics and to persuade and enable the
respective riparian states to see cooperation as a “win-win” situation for all concerned.”91 On
a somewhat similar note, Sosland suggests that two states are more likely to cooperate if they
have a common patron.92
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National Image
The degree of concern a riparian has for its national image can influence the position
it takes in negotiations and motivate a more cooperative or conflictual outcome. If a country
is pursuing a “good neighbor policy” or looking to be “a model of cooperative international
behavior” it will seek more positive resolution. Conversely, if states, especially those
upstream, choose to be “candidly egocentric,” a more negative outcome is likely.93
Sovereignty and Nationalism
When states are concerned about breaches of sovereignty, they are less willing to
cooperate. This is especially true in situations where water has come to be intertwined with a
state’s sovereign national identity. Klare writes that, for many countries, “disputes over water
have taken on a deeply emotional or symbolic character, as matters of national (or regime)
survival and identity.”94 When a regime draws some or much of its legitimacy from river
control or development, it is less likely to pursue coriparian cooperation for water
management.
Commitment of High Level Officials
When high level officials (i.e. those in positions of power above technocrats and the
bureaucracy) have a vested interest, or make a commitment to cooperative resolution, a
positive outcome is more likely. According to LeMarquand, “if the chief executive of the
basin countries can be motivated to make a commitment to resolve the issues, definitive and
innovative solutions may be more easily accomplished than if negotiations are left to the
representatives of the government departments.”95 That being said, the reverse is also posited
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to be true: leaders that define cooperative water management as in opposition to the national
strategy reduce the impetus for positive resolution.96
Epistemic Communities
Peter Haas articulates the concept of epistemic communities, which make cooperative
resolution of a transboundary environmental dispute more likely. Epistemic communities are
“transnational networks of knowledge based communities that are both politically
empowered through their claims to exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by
shared causal and principled beliefs.”97 Such groups—consisting of water experts,
technocrats, and bureaucrats—after working together to manage a resource, form
relationships and shared connections that can help encourage cooperation regardless of the
political climate. In Haas’ words, “if the group of specialists share a common world view or
believe in the same set of cause-and-effect relations, then they are likely to be particularly
influential, because they will resist the political temptations to subordinate their advice to
existing political concerns,”98 and can thus maintain cooperative resource management when
larger political relations among states deteriorate.
Economic Modernization
The processes by which states utilize shared water bodies for economic
modernization has the potential to stimulate competition and conflict. Klare suggests that
damming rivers and unilateral efforts to increase supply for a certain population’s use make
conflict more likely99 by giving the upstream riparian control over the taps of downstream
users. However, Wolf suggests that “a dam…can not only provide hydropower and other
benefits for the upstream riparian, but it can be managed to even out flow for downstream
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agriculture, or even to enhance water transportation for the benefit of both riparians.” 100
Thus, when projects that manipulate river flow are conducted jointly among states or
competing users, or when shown to equally benefit multiple actors, they may in fact foster
cooperation.
Analytical Framework
While water conflict and cooperation have been examined extensively, most authors
study them dichotomously, i.e. attempting to determine which factors will lead states to take
up arms against each other versus which motivate them sign treaties over water. While some
authors, like Gleick and Sosland, have acknowledged that water wears a variety of hats in
conflict and can be cooperative at a level below fully codified, the existing literature does not
portray water conflict and cooperation as a spectrum. The preceding section has illustrated
how water conflict and cooperation have been discussed so far throughout scholarly
literature. In the section that follows I use the above theories to outline my analytical
framework, in which I treat water conflict and cooperation as two ends of a spectrum along
which a diverse array of factors dictate where a particular transboundary water body at a
particular time falls.
The Spectrum of Conflict and Cooperation
In my conflict—cooperation framework, state interaction ranges from armed conflict
and less severe negative forms of engagement, to positive interactions such as joint projects
and treaties/codified agreements. The cooperation—conflict spectrum is shown below.
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Figure 1: Spectrum of Conflict and Cooperation

High and Low Politics
Throughout my analysis of the Tigris-Euphrates basin, I will consider whether water
plays into the relationships among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq as an issue of high or low politics.
Conventional wisdom suggests that “’high politics’ of security and survival ha[s] priority
over the ‘low politics’ of economic and social affairs.”101 High politics has many
characteristics in common with foreign policy, while low politics is often synonymous with
issues of domestic policy. Jackson writes that foreign policy is a
Separate sphere from domestic politics and activities of sovereign states. It [is] the realm of ‘high
politics’ defined and guided by reason of state, now more commonly labeled ‘national interests.’ It [is]
directed and managed by the leading state officials (emperors, kings, presidents, prime ministers,
chancellors, secretaries of state, foreign ministers, defense secretaries, etc., and their closest advisors.)
It [is] not subject to popular scrutiny or democratic control. It [is] an exclusive and often secretive
sphere of statecraft.102
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For the purposes of my analysis, I consider “high politics” to constitute foreign policy issues,
dealt with by heads of state or high-level ministers and concerning the security, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of the state(s) in question. I consider “low politics” to include more
functional, technical, administrative issues, often confined to domestic politics, considered
less crucial to national security or territorial integrity, and primarily managed by lower level
bureaucrats and technocrats.
Theoretic Model for Hydro-Cooperation and Hydro-Conflict
As the theoretical literature suggests, water can enhance cooperation or exacerbate
conflict among states. The question remains, when do we expect to see more positive or more
negative interstate interactions? The “under what conditions” section within the preceding
literature review outlined the most commonly identified intervening variables in the
literature. On the following page, I depict a schematic diagram illustrating how
transboundary water bodies can provide sources of both positive, cooperative and negative,
conflictual interaction.

Figure 2: Paths to Cooperative and Conflictual Interaction over Transboundary Waters
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In this model, scarcity is the key factor that creates the potential for conflict over
water. Without either a perception of limited supply or an actual shortage, water cannot
provide a basis for competition or, at the extreme, conflict. Real and/or perceived scarcity—
which stems from either climatic conditions/drought or unilateral development that creates
either a perception or reality of deprivation—is the factor that drives water from low politics
to high politics. As J.A. Allan suggests, “when news of a water deficit is widely known, the
issue of water security can become an issue of high politics”103 With water in the realm of
high politics, the environmental conditions are filtered through the social, political and
economic context, which determines the outcome on the conflict-cooperation scale. The four
most important intervening variables, as illustrated on the diagram above, are: 1) the
character of diplomatic relations, which includes existing political relationships or disputes,
and ties or alienation among heads of state or high level officials; 2) the influence of external
actors or outside political allegiances, which encompasses both direct intervention by a third
party in negotiations and more indirect influence of patron states or international
organizations; 3) the existence or lack of trade or other economic linkages among states; and
4) ethnic/ideological similarities and differences, which include ties or alienation stemming
from religion, ethnicity, or governing doctrine. When real or perceived water scarcity does
not exist, there is little to no potential for competition or conflict, so the potential outcomes
range only over the positive interaction side of the conflict-cooperation spectrum from no
interaction to treaties/codified agreements.
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria’s Tigris-Euphrates Basin
The Middle East is often flagged as the region where water conflict is most likely to
occur due to both its extraordinary dryness and its politically tumultuous landscape. In
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suggesting that the Middle East will be the host of the 21st century’s “water wars,” scholars
are making an assumption about how water politics relate to other political issues. They
assume that water will be more conflictual when in a context otherwise characterized by
negative relationships among states. While this is a reasonable assumption to make—it is
well established that the implications of transboundary water in any given case will be
filtered through the particular environmental, sociopolitical, and economic circumstances of
that case—there is little scholarly work that considers precisely how water issues interact
with other policy issues among states, and why they interact in the ways they do.
Widely cited as a “hot spot” for future water conflicts,104 the Tigris-Euphrates Basin,
shared among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, is an interesting case to consider in order to better
understand how hydropolitics interact with other factors in states’ relationships. The TigrisEuphrates inspires calamitous predictions because of 1) the many other potent points of
contention among the three riparian states; 2) a predicted age of unprecedented scarcity; and
3) the lack of codified agreement or treaty that allocates Tigris and Euphrates waters among
the three riparians. Are such predictions of impending tripartite conflict warranted? What do
the lessons of the past have to tell us about how water politics intertwine with other politics
among these three states?
My analysis considers the likelihood of positive and negative interaction in the TigrisEuphrates case not based upon the magnitude of scarcity/environmental degradation or
record of negotiations, as has been done,105 but through comparison of the change over time
in the trajectory of water politics and that of other sociopolitical and economic relations. I
show how the water politics of the Tigris-Euphrates basin were largely cooperative and low
104
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politics between 1918 and the early 1960s and moved to the realm of high politics and
became more conflictual in the years between 1960-2000. In the period between 2000 and
2011, water remained a high politics issue, but became dramatically more cooperative.106 My
research question is thus: why has water oscillated among positive and negative forms of
interaction and between high and low politics? In other words, what factors drive the roller
coaster of hydropolitics in the Tigris-Euphrates basin? Is scarcity the critical driver of water
relations? Or does the path of hydropolitics follow the trajectory of broader political,
economic, and social relations? Can the influence of external actors dictate a basin’s
hydropolitics? How are water politics shaped by ethnic and ideological factors? Having
answered these questions, what are the implications of the hydropolitics of the TigrisEuphrates today and in the future, and can these conclusions be applied to other river basins?
In answering these questions I apply the above-delineated frameworks to determine
what roles water plays in the relationships between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, and what factors
influence whether riparian relations are positive or negative. I argue that the mechanism that
dictates whether water is a high or low politics issue is scarcity, both real and/or perceived,
stemming from climatic conditions/drought or unilateral, upstream water development. The
driver of the Tigris-Euphrates water politics’ oscillation from cooperative to conflictual and
to cooperative once again is not scarcity or equity of access, as is often suggested, but rather
the security implications of other political, economic, and social issues that may have been
linked to water or create conditions for cooperative or conflictual relationships overall.107 In
opposition to those who suggest that water scarcity will lead to conflict or encourage
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cooperation, I suggest that water in the Tigris Euphrates basin has not thusfar been a “cause”
for either negative, conflictual relations or positive, cooperative interaction. Rather, water
politics have followed the tenor of other political, social, and economic issues that shape
relations among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and have yet to provide an independent source of
dispute. As would be predicted by the power asymmetry thesis, the upstream state, Turkey
often sets the tone of both hydropolitics and wider political relationships in the TigrisEuphrates. Turkey’s foreign policy choices have the largest implications for tripartite basin
relations overall and Syria often holds the cards in its relationship with downstream Iraq.
Although armed conflict over Tigris and Euphrates waters exclusively is unlikely, it is still
important to understand why water is drawn into politics and under what conditions it
follows, or diverges from, the path of political relationships in general, both positively and
negatively.
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Chapter 2: The Tigris Euphrates Basin Over Time

108

Figure 3: The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers

The Tigris-Euphrates basin’s history can be divided into three time periods, and
within each, water has played a distinct but consistent role in the domestic and foreign policy
of the three riparian states. From the fracturing of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 to the
beginning of large-scale hydro-development in the late 1950s and early 1960s, water was low
on the political agendas of the three riparian states and reflected the relatively cooperative
climate of the times. From 1960 to 2000, as hydro-development took off, water’s power as a
economic and political tool was recognized, it was elevated to a central position in high
politics and fueled dispute among the three riparian states. Between 2000 and 2011, though
remaining in high politics, water policy among Turkey, Iraq and Syria became more positive
and collaborative. This chapter will illustrate these oscillations in hydropolitics from low
cooperative to high conflictual and high conflictual to high cooperative, and the following
chapter will explain this variation over time.
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Time Period 1: 1918-1960
After the end of the First World War and up until the late 1950s/early 1960s, water
was a low politics issue in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and the hydropolitics of the TigrisEuphrates Basin were comprised of positive, cooperative interactions among the three
riparian states. When addressed, the water issue was managed by lower level technical
bureaucrats from the three states and was embedded in management of other economic and
social policies. During this period, the three states (or their colonial puppeteers) entered into
treaties and agreements that were primarily focused on defining their basic bilateral
relationships but also included brief references to cooperative water management.
New States and New Hydro-Relationships
At the end of the First World War, the Ottoman “sick man of Europe” breathed its
final breath, and Europe carved up the deceased empire into the Middle East’s modern
nation-states, transforming the Tigris-Euphrates Basin into a transboundary river system.
British-controlled Iraq was comprised of old Ottoman districts, Baghdad, Basra, and
Mosul,109 and contained the lower 1060km of the Euphrates and 1418km of the Tigris.110
Syria, made up of the old Greater Syria minus Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon,111 was given
to France in 1920 and included 710km of the Euphrates and 32km of the Tigris forming its
border with Turkey.112 Turkey arose at the heart of the old Ottoman Empire in Anatolia
where originate the headwaters of both the Euphrates and Tigris, which then flow for
1230km and1850km respectively before exiting Turkish territory.113 While Iraqi nationalists
did not win independence from the British until 1932 (and even then much British

109

Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex,” 106.
Food and Agriculture Organization, Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, 3.
Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex,” 106.
112
Food and Agriculture Organization, Euphrates-Tigris River Basin, 3.
113
Ibid.
110
111

Wasinger 32
institutional structure remained)114 and France did not give Syrians independence until
1941,115 the man who would become the father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,
expelled the British and established the Turkish Republic in 1923.116 It was under such
conditions of semi-autonomy and rapid state consolidation that Turkey, Iraq, and Syria began
to manage their rivers.
During this period, water was treated as a low politics, primarily domestic issue.
Between the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the 1960s, “transboundary waters were the
subject of domestic planning and development exercises and had little to do with the foreign
policy agenda. Those involved in transboundary water relations at that time were…mediumlevel technocrats, advisers, and professionals who prepared the technical ground for the
drafting of the water-related clauses of the treaties.”117 Thus, water was largely an
administrative, rather than foreign policy, concern in this first period, and the external water
policy that did exist prior to the late 1950s was very much embedded within the creation of
overall bilateral relations and the finalization of territorial claims among the three newly
independent riparian states.
Several treaties, aimed at establishing peace among the three states, address water
within other cooperative frameworks and form the basis for the positive hydropolitical
interactions among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria during this period. The agreements, their dates,
parties, and water provisions are as follows:
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Year:
1920

Treaty Name:
Convention of 23
December 1920

Parties:
Britain (Iraq),
France
(Syria)

1921

Agreement of 20
October 1921

1923

Treaty of Lausanne

Turkey,
France
(Syria)
Turkey,
Britain (Iraq)

1926

Friendship and
Neighborly
Relations
Convention

Turkey,
France
(Syria)

1930

French-Turkish
Protocol

Turkey,
France
(Syria)

1946

Treaty of
Friendship and
Good Neighborly
Relations

Turkey, Iraq

Provisions Regarding Tigris and Euphrates Use:
“Any plans for irrigation in Syria that might diminish ‘in any
considerable degree’ the flow of the Tigris or Euphrates were
to be examined by a commission nominated by the two
governments.”118
“The city of Aleppo may organize, at its own expense, a watersupply from the Euphrates in Turkish territory in order to meet
the requirements of the district.”119
“’Turkey should confer with Iraq before beginning any
activities that may alter the flow of the Euphrates’ (Bakour and
Kolars 1994: 139).”120
Required Turkey to increase the flow of the Koveik river or
authorize off-take of Euphrates flow to satisfy the needs of
irrigated areas around Aleppo within Syria.121
Also mandates that “water disputes would be resolved ‘on the
basis of complete equality.’”122
Established the Commisson on the Demarcation of the TurcoSyrian Frontier.123
Affirmed previous agreements and committed the two states to
coordinate any planned utilization of Euphrates water.124
Delineates rights and responsibilities of both states regarding
Tigris and Euphrates water.
Turkey would begin monitoring the rivers and share data.
Turkey would report to Iraq on any plans to develop Euphrates
and Tigris waters, allowed for separate negotiations.
Iraq could construct dams within Turkish territory for flood
prevention (construction cost born by Iraq, maintenance costs
shared).
Established that most suitable dam sites for flood prevention
were in Turkey.125

Table 1: Water-related Treaties of 1918-1960

As the provisions of these treaties illustrate, the riparian relationships among the three states
were positive and cooperative between 1918 and the 1950s. Though none of these treaties are
tripartite or establish measurable river rights, they highlight the degree to which the three
states interacted collaboratively with regard to water during this time period. As all of these
treaties were primarily designed to deal with territorial and security issues unrelated to water,
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and addressed water as a subordinate, technical, and administrative concern, water inhabited
the realm of low politics.
Time Period 2: 1960-2000
At the end of the 1950s, the hydropolitical dynamics among Turkey, Syria and Iraq
began to change considerably. Between 1960 and 2000, the three states experienced recurring
friction over the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. During this time period, water was
catapulted from its minor, technical role within low politics to become intertwined with
issues of high politics, at times taking center stage on the agendas of presidents and prime
ministers. The newly recognized power and importance of water in interstate relations drove
conflicting claims for the Tigris-Euphrates waters and repeatedly came close to providing the
impetus for war.
The Troubled Waters of Development
By the early 1960s, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria had each designed ambitious
development projects for their stretches of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Although the
potential for the twin rivers to fuel development and economic improvement in the three
riparian states was acknowledged before the 1960s,126 this decade marked the early
implementation of large-scale water projects. As all three states faced growing populations
and escalating energy demands, they looked to the Tigris and Euphrates. Turkey and Syria,
both of which barely used the Tigris or Euphrates waters prior to the 1960s, began rapid,
ambitious development projects to harness the waters’ potential. Iraq, where water
infrastructure dated back to the 1930s (and even pre-WWI),127 expanded the goals and altered
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the scope of its projects, like its neighbors, increasing the demands it placed on the two
rivers.
Turkey
In 1955, an ambitious young Turk, Süleyman Demeril, was named director of the
State Hydraulics Works (DSI). Demeril, who would go on to be elected Prime Minster ten
years later, came to be known as Turkey’s “King of Dams.”128 The name was not
unwarranted—during his stint at DSI, Demeril oversaw most of the planning for the
Southeastern Anatolia Project, which involved the construction of 22 dams and 19
hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey’s nine poorest provinces.129
As Prime Minister, he championed the project as key to Turkey’s development and defended
it against the sharp criticisms of Turkey’s southern neighbors.130
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi--GAP) in its early
formulations was primarily targeted toward meeting Turkey’s growing energy and
agricultural needs. In 1970, close to 60 percent of Turkey lacked electricity and a growing
industrial sector in the western part of the country was driving a rapidly rising demand.
Energy needs were predicted to increase 9.5 percent from 1990-2000 and seven percent from
2000-2010.131 Similarly, increasing oil prices in the 1970s sparked a push for Turkish energy
independence.132 As one of the most oil-poor nations of the Middle East, Turkey looked to
use GAP to capitalize on its remarkable hydroelectric capacity. Early predictions showed
GAP increasing Turkey’s hydroelectric production to take advantage of 45 percent of the
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country’s 100billion KW hydroelectric potential, supplying 25 percent of Turkey’s overall
electricity.133 Turkey’s population more than doubled between 1950 and 1980, and, with
annual growth rates of 2.2 percent, was expected to exceed 70 million by 2000.134 Turkey
hoped to maintain food security throughout its rapid growth and improve its balance of
payments with exports of $20 million worth of profitable cash crops to the rest of the Middle
East.135 With 40 percent of Turkey’s arable land located in the nation’s southeast, GAP’s
multipurpose dams would irrigate 1.6 million ha area for agriculture while providing 24
billion KW of electricity.136
GAP evolved to include broader development goals. With per capita income in the
GAP region only 47 percent of the national average, DSI hoped the hydro-development
project would spark general industrial and economic expansion to close the country’s
socioeconomic gap.137 Through improved standards of living and growing employment
opportunities, GAP also aimed to prevent emigration from the GAP region and better equip
local cities to attract and manage growing populations.138 However, despite these largely
benevolent goals, the Turks were not unaware of the implications GAP would have for their
control of, and claim to, the Tigris and Euphrates waters. In a 1970 feasibility report, DSI
reportedly wrote, “In the absence of a water treaty among riparian interests, precedence of
beneficial use becomes an important criterion in the adjudication of water rights.”139 Thus,
while the motivations for Turkey’s design and implementation of GAP were largely
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economic, Turkey was not blind to the implications its control of the Tigris and Euphrates
would have for its relationships with co-riparian states.

Figure 4: Hydro-development on the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey140

Turkey initiated its hydro-development with the construction of the Keban Dam on
the Euphrates between 1966 and 1973.141 Keban was followed between 1976 and 1987 by the
Karakya dam, also on the Euphrates. In securing funding for these dams, Turkey faced World
Bank concerns about water flow to Iraq and Syria and assured the World Bank that Syria
would receive at least 450-500m3/s. Despite these promises to the World Bank, Turkey at the
time did not provide the same guarantees to Syria and Iraq themselves.142 Because of the lack
of basin-wide agreement on Turkey’s project, Turkey lost World Bank support for GAP in
1980 as it began the plans for the project’s crown jewel, the Atatürk Dam. Unlike its
forerunners, Atatürk stored a large volume of water for irrigation and thus was perceived as
140
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more substantially impacting downstream flow to Iraq and Syria.143 Despite funding
challenges, GAP continued, primarily financed from Turkish state coffers.144
Ninety-eight percent of the Euphrates flow originates in Turkey, and upon
completion, GAP would provide Turkey with control of 40 percent of that river’s waters
flowing into Syria and 80 percent of Tigris and Euphrates waters to Iraq.145 Just over half of
GAP projects are located on the Euphrates and those that focus on irrigation would drain the
river of 30 percent of its average annual flow.146 From Syria and Iraq’s perspectives, these
figures clearly raise a red flag. However, GAP has one underrated benefit for Turkey’s
downstream neighbors: the dams’ regulation of the Euphrates and Tigris flow, which, prior to
Turkish development, exhibited dramatic seasonal fluctuations and caused damaging floods
in all three states.147 Despite the mix of beneficial and potentially harmful effects of Turkey’s
GAP project, water scholar John Waterbury has pointed out that “Turkey could claim,
although [there is] no evidence that it has, that it has undertaken at its own expense precisely
the kinds of works provided for in the 1946 treaty,”148 in which Iraq gave Turkey the right to
undertake flood control projects on the two rivers provided that Turkey communicate its
plans to Iraq.
A summary of GAP’s key components is shown below:
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Euphrates River
Hydroelectric
Capacity:
Keban Dam (1974)
1240MW
Name:

Karakya Dam
(1988)
Atatürk Dam (1990)
Biriçek Dam (2000)
Karkamiș Dam
(2000)
Total:

Irrigation
Potential:
N/A

1800MW

N/A

2400MW
672MW
180MW

852,781 ha
70,000 ha
N/A

5400MW

Name:
Ilisu Dam (in
progress)
Cizre Dam (in
progress)
Dicle (1997)
Kralkizi Dam (1997)
Batman Dam (1999)

1,083,000
Total:
ha
Table 2: Major Dams of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)149

Tigris River
Hydroelectric
Capacity:
1200MW
240MW

Irrigation
Potential:
N/A

110MW
94MW
185.6MW

120,000
ha
218,920 ha
80,000 ha
37,744 ha

5960MW

558,000 ha

Syria
In the mid-20th century, Syria faced increasing energy and agricultural demands
similar to Turkey’s. With a population growing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent and
electricity demand at rising at close to 20 percent per year in the latter half of the 20th
century, 150 Syria felt a pressing need to employ the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin for
agricultural production and energy provision. After Soviet-funded surveys of Euphrates dam
potential in the late 1950s, Syria established the Syrian General Establishment of the
Euphrates Project in 1961.151 The Syrian Euphrates Project, also known as the Euphrates
Valley Project, was officially launched in 1966 when Syria began construction of the Soviet
and German funded Tabqa Dam.152 The Syrians had ambitious plans for the dam: irrigating
850,000 ha and producing 800MW of electricity.153 The Tabqa was completed in 1973 and
its reservoir was filled by 1975 to create the 11bilion m3 Lake Assad.154 Following the
initiation of Tabqa, Syria set up the General Administration for the Development of the
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Euphrates Basin in 1968, which hatched plans for nine hydropower projects to be launched
by 1988.155

Figure 5: Hydro-development on the Euphrates in Syria156

Despite ambitious goals, many of Syria’s projects were seen as a disappointment,
particularly the Tabqa dam. Although the dam provided 60 percent of Syria’s electricity by
the turn of the century and accounted for close to 100 percent of the water supply to
Aleppo,157 its irrigation and energy production has fallen well short of its goals. The Soviet
design of the dam did not account for the land’s uneven topography, so the dam regularly
fails to meet full electricity demands during seasonal river fluctuations.158 Similarly, while
exact figures vary, there is widespread consensus that Tabqa’s predicted agricultural
expansions of an additional 650,000 ha of irrigated farmland were not realized due to Syria’s
high gypsum content soils (gypsum is quite soluble, leading to the collapse of irrigation
155
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channels built in gypsum-rich soils).159 In fact, Syria’s irrigated land area fell by close to 20
percent between the 1960s and 1990s, due to salinization, inundation, waterlogging and
changing land laws.160 Syria’s salinization problems, along with lower-than expected energy
and irrigation output can be attributed to both its physical characteristics and changes in flow
stemming from completion of Turkey’s upstream projects.161 Despite challenges, Syria went
forward with a plan to install pump irrigation for 150,000 ha on the Tigris in 1989162 and
followed the Tabqa dam with construction of the Al-Baath and Tishrin dams in 1986 and
1999 respectively.163 Though environmental factors have limited the success of Syria’s
hydro-development projects, as in Turkey, the Tigris and Euphrates have been viewed and
utilized as tools to boost Syria’s economy and provide food and energy to her populations.
Iraq
Iraq’s hydro-development has followed a similar model. With an ample supply of oil and
relatively flat topography164 (which limits the construction of large dams necessary for
hydroelectric production), Iraq’s development ambitions on the Tigris and Euphrates
originally emphasized flood control, irrigation, and desalinization. Iraq’s modern river
development began earlier than her upstream neighbors--in 1939 with the construction of the
Al-Kut Barrage165 (a barrage is a low dam) and followed in 1956 with the Habbaniya project
and Samara and Euphrates Barrages for flood control.166 By the 1960s, Iraq was irrigating ten
times as much land as Turkey and five times as much as Syria.167
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Figure 6: Hydro-development on the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq168

Despite topographical challenges, Iraq was keen on opportunities to produce cheap
hydropower at home and reserve petroleum for export. By the latter part of the 1970s, half of
Iraqi electricity was provided by hydropower.169 In the mid-1970s, with Soviet aid, Iraq’s
Higher Agricultural Council, Land Reclamation Organization, and Ministry of Irrigation
created the General Scheme for Planning Water and Land Resources of Iraq (also known as
the “Revolutionary Plan”170), which involved investing $300 million in 20 irrigation,
hydropower, flood control, and water storage projects to be completed by 2000.171 Though
Saddam Hussein’s rise to power in 1979 altered the state’s land and water bureaucracy, it did
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not slow water development. The Haditha Dam for irrigation and hydropower was completed
in 1987, followed by the Baghdadi Dam, begun in 1990. A system of barrages and dams
lower on the Euphrates, including the Hindaya, Fallouja, and Hammourabi, all constructed in
the 1980s, provide irrigation, diversion, and regulation.172 While much of Turkey’s
development of the Tigris is in progress, and Syria’s is close to non-existent, Iraq’s Mosul
dam on the upper Tigris has been providing up to 750MW of power and irrigating nearly
250,000 ha of farmland173 since 1983.174
The most unique and ambitious of Iraq’s development projects is the Third (or
Saddam) River. Beginning as the Thartar Canal, the idea was to connect the Tigris and
Euphrates through a reservoir and canal, allowing Iraq to supplement any decreases in
Euphrates flow with water from the Tigris. However, the plan evolved to consist of a
350mile-long navigable canal between the two rivers that facilitates Iraq’s transfer of water
from the Tigris to Euphrates and back while simultaneously removing excess irrigation
drainage water from fields around Baghdad and desalinizing polluted agricultural land in the
south near Basra.175 The Third River, for which construction was completed in 1992,
eventually empties into the Persian Gulf alongside Tigris and Euphrates waters.176 While the
final configuration of the project has received ample international criticism on environmental
and human rights grounds (the ecologically rich Mesopotamian Marshes, home to the Shi’ite
Marsh Arabs who historically opposed the Iraqi regime, were drained in creation of the Third
River),177 both Syria and Turkey were in support of Iraq facilitating the transfer of water
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between the Tigris and Euphrates178 as it justified, to a certain degree, continued
development on the Euphrates in the two upstream states.179
1960s: Unproductive Negotiations and Competing Claims
Recognizing their potentially competing claims for Tigris and Euphrates waters, the
three states convened during the early phases of designing and implementing their schemes.
After Syria announced its plans to construct the Tabqa Dam in 1962,180 the riparians entered
into a series of ultimately unproductive technical bipartite and tripartite talks attended by
mid-level economic ministers from the three countries that lasted until the early 1970s.181 At
a 1962 meeting between Syria and Iraq, the two states agreed to exchange technical
information regarding river flow182 and in a meeting between Turkey’s Ministry of Energy
and Natural Resources and equivalent Iraqi representatives signed agreements for similar
exchanges of information.183 In a 1965 tripartite meeting (the first meeting of representatives
from all three states), following the recommendations of a World Bank report,184 Turkey
suggested the creation of a Joint Technical Committee to evaluate the two rivers’ flow and
the needs of the three riparians to ensure an equitable division.185 The initially promising
negotiations turned sour after the three states announced their respective development plans’
demands for the rivers: Turkey 14 billion cubic meters, Iraq 18 billion, and Syria 13 billion.
The demands added up to a full one and a half times (15 billion cubic meters) more than
actual river capacity.186 While Turkey agreed in 1966 to guarantee at least 350m3/s of flow
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during the impounding of the Keban Dam on the Euphrates, the first dam of its development
project for Southeastern Anatolia, no long-term agreement was reached during the series of
negotiations.187
During these meetings, Turkey staked a claim to the Tigris and Euphrates based on
the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty whereby a state “has an unrestrained right to
use the water resources within its own territory.”188 Brismar (2002) has argued that part of
Turkey’s motivation for GAP was the need to exercise this claim to the river189 and
undermine its neighbors’ claims of historical rights. Iraq expressed its claim of historical or
acquired rights to use of the Tigris and Euphrates based on the fact that it was the first of the
three riparian states to develop water projects along the rivers.190 Syria similarly claimed
acquired rights and riparian rights, which dictate, “every state along the course of a river has
an inherent right to the water of that river, which is not to be diminished or degraded without
that state’s concurrence.”191 These competing claims led to full blown crisis in the mid1970s.
The Crisis of 1975
By the end of 1973, both Turkey and Syria’s first large dams were relatively complete
(Keban in Turkey and Tabqa in Syria), and full functionality waited only on the filling of
their respective reservoirs. Unfortunately, the timing for filling the dam reservoirs coincided
with two years of drought.192 During the first season that spring flood waters were
impounded behind both reservoirs, Iraq, the farthest downstream state, experienced dramatic
drops in water levels, and so requested that Damascus release an additional 200m3/s
187
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downstream. The following year, as the two upstream dams once again decreased flows to
fill their reservoirs, Iraq accused Syria of diminishing the flow from the usual 920m3/s to an
“intolerable” 197m3/s,193 and keeping more water than necessary in Lake Assad behind
Tabqa dam for political reasons.194 Iraq blamed Syria for loss of 70 percent of Iraq’s winter
crops and the suffering of more than three million Iraqi farmers,195 and called upon the Arab
League to intervene.
Amidst this crisis, Syria and Iraq came close to engaging in armed conflict. After
Syria refused to cooperate with first an Arab League, then a Saudi Arabia-mediated,
resolution and closed her airspace to Iraq, the two states sent troops to their mutual border
and suspended flights. Despite Syria’s claims that she was passing on more than two thirds of
the water coming to her from Turkey, Iraq threatened Syria that it was prepared to “take any
action necessary to ensure the Euphrates flow”196 and there were reports of Iraqi plans to
blow up the Tabqa dam. The tense situation was not helped when a Syrian soldier was
discovered on the Iraqi side of the border placing explosives inside Kerbala, an Iraqi holy
city.197
Tensions finally died down after Soviet and Saudi mediated efforts convinced Syria
to agree to release additional water downstream to Iraq. There are conflicting accounts as to
the precise agreements: Rubin and Kirisci cite an additional 200m3/s per year as the agreed
upon extra water flow from Syria, while Naff and Matson credit a Syrian decision that 60
percent of Euphrates water that got to Syria from Turkey would go on to Iraq and 40 percent
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would be utilized in Syria.198 Despite the fact that the filling of the Keban dam contributed to
the lack of water downstream in Syria and Iraq, Turkey was never brought into this crisis.
Missed Shots at Peace
Following the drama of the mid-1970s, the 1980s heralded a multitude of failed
attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the Tigris-Euphrates issue. In 1980, Turkey and Iraq
agreed to establish a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) for Tigris and Euphrates
cooperation.199 Syria began attending JTC meetings in 1983 and, although 16 trilateral JTC
meetings were held over the following 10 years, they were primarily concerned with factfinding and communications to determine how to begin to allocate the basin’s waters.
Unfortunately, the JTC had no real power and did not succeed in catalyzing a trilateral
agreement. JTC meetings deteriorated in the early 1990s and would not be reinstated until the
mid-2000s.200
To assuage the fears of its downstream neighbors and share its water abundance with
the rest of the Middle East, Turkey’s then Prime Minister, Turgut Özal proposed two “Peace
Pipelines” in the mid 1980s.201 The Peace Pipeline project would have sent water from the
Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in Turkey through the “Western Pipeline” to several large
metropolitan areas in Syria and Jordan and through the “Gulf Pipeline” to urban centers in
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.202 While
the project appeared feasible environmentally and financially (the necessary $20 billion was
fronted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Islamic
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Development Bank),203 it was ultimately politically unpalatable to the other states of the
Middle East. Key pipeline states Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cited concerns related to higherthan-local water prices and fear of Turkish water monopoly in the region.204
The 1987 Protocols
Conflictual water politics inhabited the top of riparian agendas amidst security crises
of the late 1980s, and between Turkey and Syria became linked Kurdish militancy. In 1986,
Syrian Prime Minister Abd Al-Rauf Al-Kasm “stressed that the Euphrates was of vital
importance to Syria, and implied that if during the building of the major dams of GAP,
Turkey retained an excessive amount of Euphrates’ waters, Syria could retaliate with other
means.”205 By “other means,” the Syrian regime intimated that any action on Turkey’s part to
decrease downstream flow would result in Syria upping its support for militants, like those of
the Kuridstan Worker’s Party (PKK), inside Turkey.206 In 1986, 25 people were arrested
throughout Anatolia after a plot was discovered to plant explosives in Atatürk Dam and blow
up connected parts of GAP.207 Though the men were caught before they were able to carry
out their plan, Turkish authorities discovered that Syria had funded the attack out of concerns
that the entirety of Euphrates flow would be cut off upon completion of GAP.208
On the heels of this diplomatic fiasco, Turkey and Syria came to a temporary
agreement in 1987. At back-to-back economic and security meetings with participation of
both Turkish and Syrian Prime Ministers, Turkey and Syria signed protocols designed to
delink water politics from security politics. In the economic protocol, Turkey promised to
maintain a yearly average Euphrates flow of 500 cubic m/s while filling Ataturk Dam
203
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reservoir and until an official, tripartite allocation was reached.209 In the following protocol,
“Cooperation on Security Problems,” Syria promised to extradite insurgents (it was implied
that Syrian and Turkish leadership referred to the PKK in the use of the term “insurgents”)
and both sides would “prevent activities against the other from originating in their
countries.”210
Although it initially seemed that both sides would hold to the agreements, in 1989,
after PKK militants captured in Turkey continued to admit to being trained and backed by the
Syrians, Turkey’s Özal stated that “he had doubts that Syria was adhering to the Mutual
Security accord signed in 1987…[and] added that if Syria did not stick to the requirements of
the 1987 accord Turkey would also see itself not bound by the requirements of its 1987
promise to deliver 500 cubic meters of water per second downstream.”211 The failure of the
1987 agreement to elicit cooperation on Turkey and Syria’s mutual water and security
concerns laid the unsteady foundations for water politics to once again tip the scale towards
armed conflict among the three riparians, in 1990.
The Crisis of 1990
In 1989, Turkey began to herald the coming completion of the Atatürk dam, crown
jewel of its Southeastern Anatolia Project. Turkey announced to downstream riparians, Syria
and Iraq, that, in January of 1990, Turkey would begin a month-long diversion of Euphrates
flow in order to fill the Atatürk reservoir.212 With river levels predicted to drop to 120m3/s,
Turkey planned to release extra water (750-1000m3/s) in the months before it began
impoundment in order to guarantee that flow levels did not fall below the 500m3/s agreed
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upon in 1987.213 Prior to impoundment, the Turkish Foreign Ministry even sent
representatives to both Damascus and Baghdad to make guarantees to the downstream states’
governments that filling of the Ataturk dam was “not a political maneuver to apply pressure
on our neighbors,” and noting that Turkish farmers between the Atatürk dam and the Syrian
border would also be affected during the month of impoundment.214
Despite these seemingly friendly reassurances, Turkey’s choice to continue with dam
impoundment despite an ongoing drought was perceived as purposeful water hostility from
Ankara and not taken well south of Turkey’s border. Both Syria and Iraq demanded that the
impoundment period be shortened and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, which claimed that
the country stood to lose 1.3 million hectares of agricultural farmland in the month of
diminished Euphrates flow, “considered the Euphrates problem as the most important issue
between the two neighbors.”215 Syria opposed Turkey on the grounds that the diminished
flow would largely snuff out the water supply to Aleppo.216 Iraq, feeling excluded from Syria
and Turkey’s 1987 agreement on 500m3/s Euphrates flow, called for a trilateral treaty that
guaranteed a Euphrates flow of 700m3/s out of Turkey. When Turkey was unwilling to meet
such demands, Iraq threatened to deny renewal of the 1984 Turkey-Iraq Security Protocol
(which gave Turkey permission to pursue militants up to 5km into Iraqi territory) and there
were reports of Iraqi threats to bomb Euphrates dams in Turkey217 if Ankara did not
compromise on the water issue.218 Just days before dam impoundment began, a group of
PKK fighters with Syrian ID cards was caught crossing Syria’s border into Turkey. Though
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the incident was never expressly linked to the impending Euphrates diversion, it has been
suggested that the actions were characteristic of a covert Assad response to the water issue.219
To Ankara’s dismay, the filling of the Atatürk dam reservoir finally united Syria and Iraq
on water concerns. Both feeling the victim of Turkey’s unilateral development, Syria and
Iraq in late 1990 reaffirmed their prior agreement that Syria would utilize 42 percent of the
flow out of Turkey and allow 58 percent to continue on to Iraq.220 After the Atatürk reservoir
impoundment was completed and flow returned to normal, tempers cooled between Turkey
and the two downstream riparians.221 Despite Iraq and Syria’s brief cooperation, the Gulf
War, which started mere months after the impoundment, widened the gap between Baghdad
and Damascus, diminishing their combined leverage against Turkey.222 Although the Atatürk
dam incident was largely forgotten about after flows returned to normal, it had made its mark
on the physical landscape—a 70-mile dry brown area stretched from the Turkish border to
Lake Assad where Syrian farmers had been unable to irrigate their crops during the monthlong diversion.223
The End of an Age
After the Atatürk Dam crisis, the water issue remained largely at an impasse for the
last 10 years of the century. The dam crisis effectively ended the little tripartite cooperation
that existed throughout the 1980s with the end of Joint Technical Committee meetings in the
early 1990s.224 Turkey was scheduled to host the Middle East Water Summit in November
1991, but it was cancelled in light of the outbreak of the Gulf War, collapse of the Soviet
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Union, and death of then Turkish President Özal.225 Meanwhile, Turkey and Syria continued
to exchange threatening words related to water and separatist militants, and animosities
among all three regimes remained. In 1999, soon after the leader of the PKK, Abdullah
Öcalan was expelled from Syria and captured by Turkish officials, Turkey increased water
flow to Syria.226
Though the 20th century ended on a relatively conciliatory note, the tenor of water
politics since 1960 was more-often-than-not negative and conflictual. As has been illustrated,
water during this time period remained primarily in the arena of high politics. Dealt with by
prime ministers and presidents, it raised dispute among the three riparian states alongside
central security issues. During the following time period, between 2000 and 2010, water
would remain in high politics but prove a far less divisive issue among the Tigris-Euphrates’
three riparian states.
Time Period 3: 2000-2010
“If we ask a Turk living on the banks of the Euphrates whether he wants his Syrian brother to
go without water he will reply, ‘Absolutely not.’”–Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, 2004
227

The coming of the new millennium marked a dramatic change in Turkey, Syria, and
Iraq’s water power politics. While the latter half of the 20th century often brought bilateral
and trilateral tension and conflict, the 21st opened to a decade of unprecedented cooperation
among all three riparian states. Despite violence and political upheaval in Iraq, and the worst
drought in centuries afflicting the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, water no longer served as a source
of dispute among the three states during this time period. Though it remained largely in high
politics, dealt with by presidents, prime ministers, and other top-level officials alongside
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security concerns, it was an arena of cooperation rather than contention. During this time
period, while dramatic progress was made in bilateral and trilateral discourse about water, no
treaties were implemented, nor permanent water allocations agreed upon.
Hydro-Cooperation: New Views for a New Millennium
The Tigris-Euphrates co-riparian states rang in the new millennium with renewed
bilateral water cooperation on all fronts. In January 2001, Iraq and Syria held talks to reach a
new water sharing agreement.228 Although the agreement’s specifics, which included a
“formula for sharing the waters of the Euphrates between Iraq and Syria,”229 were never
made public, the agreement was largely intended to represent a call upon Turkey to initiate
trilateral discussion on the water issue.230 Syria and Iraq reiterated the desire for tripartite
cooperation in 2005. According to The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Syrian Premier
Mohammed Naji Ottri received Iraqi Minister of Electricity Abdullateif Rasheid, and
Minister of Water Resources, Mohsen Shalash, in June to sign an agreement indicating
Syrian and Iraqi intentions to sustain their exchange of Euphrates river operational, climatic,
and hydrological data and to contact Turkey to revive the tripartite Joint Technical
Committee.231 Syria also articulated a plan to release extra water from its dams to help spur
much-needed Iraqi electricity production.232
Although Turkey did not attend either of Iraq and Syria’s early meetings,233 the two
Arab states were not alone in their bilateral progress in the first years of the 21st century. In
August 2001, Syrian Minister of irrigation Taha al-Atrash visited sites on Turkey’s
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Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)234 as part of a larger Turkish-Syrian cooperation on
river development. The administration for Turkey’s GAP project and its counterpart in Syria,
the General Organization for Land Development (GOLD), signed a joint communiqué for
cooperation on the two projects.235 Turkey and Syria planned to exchange information
regarding water quality and irrigation management and to collaborate on research, training,
agricultural education programs, and even some environmental protection and rural
development projects.236 On the one-year anniversary of Syria and Turkey’s Joint
Communiqué, Syrian Minister of Irrigation Ridwan Martini appreciated Turkey’s awareness
of the Syrian peoples’ need for water and stated that “waters flowing from Turkey to Syria
should bring happiness to the peoples of both countries.”237 This sentiment was echoed after
Syria’s new president, Bashar al-Assad, met with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan during his first-ever visit to Turkey in 2004. According to Assad, the Turks brought
up the water issue during the meeting and presented a new proposal for cooperation.238 While
the details were not publicized, the proposal led Assad to state in an interview with Milliyet,
“In my opinion neither the Syrian State nor its people have any problem with Turkey over
water.”239 Though not conclusive in terms of a more permanent bilateral water agreement,
this statement represents a remarkable about-face from Syria’s view of Turkey’s use of the
Tigris-Euphrates waters just five years earlier.
While bilateral cooperation on the water issue in the early 2000s was more limited on
the Iraq-Turkey front, it was not altogether non-existent. In 2003, on a visit of Turkey’s
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Energy and Natural Resources Ministry to Iraq, Turkey announced plans to sell Iraq water. In
addition to electricity transmissions and diesel oil sales, it was agreed that Turkey’s State
Hydraulic Works (DSI) would both transport water from a purification facility in the
southeastern Sanliurfa province to Iraq and support Iraq’s agricultural irrigation efforts.240 To
this end, Turkey in 2004 provided Iraq’s newly reformed Ministry of Water Resources with
water flow data.241 According to Lorenz (2008), “This was significant because the parties
ha[d] long treated flow data as a national security secret.”242
As is evident, the early part of the new millennium’s first decade was characterized
by promising bilateral cooperation on all sides. Though Syria and Iraq’s calls for a tripartite
meeting were not yet answered, the dialogue occurring on all sides represented remarkable
progress since the previous period. Many of the above discussions and agreements were
conducted in tandem with security and military negotiations, and, as discussed, it was often
high level technocrats or even heads of state involved in these bilateral water negotiations.
Three is a Magic Number: The Revival of Tripartite Negotiation
Although representatives of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s governments would not come
together again to discuss water until 2007,243 civil society within the three states took
advantage of the opportunity for water cooperation starting in 2005. That year, scholars,
scientists, and professionals from Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and the United States established the
Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC).244 Recognizing the limits of formal
government negotiation, ETIC’s aim was to “provide opportunities to enhance the dialogue
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and mutual understanding among the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris System”245 through
“voluntary, nonofficial, nonbinding, not for profit, and non-governmental” track two
diplomacy.246 More recently, ETIC has put an emphasis on climate change, endeavoring to
develop a database of agricultural, historical, hydrologic, and development information for
use of the three riparian governments in their official negotiations.247 Though it is unclear
what, if any, impact ETIC had upon official negotiations, the mere existence of such an
institution is indicative of the warming climate for cooperation among the three riparian
states. It also represented the first forum of water experts from all three countries to convene
since the Joint Technical Committee meetings of the 1990s.
During Syrian irrigation minister al-Atrash’s visit to Turkey’s GAP in 2001, he called
for a revival of the tripartite Joint Technical Committee (JTC).248 Though it took six years,
his wish came true in 2007. The JTC was reinstated after the Turkish Minister of the
Environment and Forestry, Syrian Minister of Irrigation, and Iraqi Minister of Water
Resources identified it as the most effective “cooperative framework to deal with regional
water issues.”249 Between late 2007 and 2010, the JTC met several times to discuss river
monitoring, joint training programs in irrigation management, information exchange for
climate and drought data.250 The three states also agreed to build or repair river flow
measuring gauges and Turkey acquiesced to increase downstream flow from 500m3/s to
550m3/s during the dry season of 2009 in the face of worsening drought.251 At a 2008 JTC
meeting, ministers from the three states decided to “establish a trilateral water institute
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comprised of 15 water engineers from each country in order to conduct studies aimed at
achieving efficiency in water use and management in the region.”252 Located at Atatürk Dam
in Turkey and paid for by the Turkish government, the institute253 mapped the basin’s water
resources and drafted recommendations for each state’s management of the Tigris and
Euphrates waters in its borders.254 In 2009, the three states signed a memorandum of
understanding, which “focused on the establishment of joint measurement stations on the
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, exchange of meteorological information, observation of water
amount that goes into Syria and Iraq every season, and evaluation of the impact of climate
change on the two rivers.”255 This memorandum capped the late 2000s period of promising
tripartite cooperation.
High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils
While the revitalization of the JTC and the establishment of the trilateral water
institute were by far the most substantial illustrations of tripartite water cooperation in the
2000s, 2008 and 2009 witnessed immense progress on bilateral fronts as well. Top diplomats
in Turkey and Iraq established a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC) in 2008
to cover a broad range of issues between the two states, including, “encouraging cooperation
in the field of water resources and agriculture to assist Iraq in meeting its agricultural needs
and water requirements including irrigation by taking into account Turkey’s agricultural
needs and water requirements to provide such assistance.”256 This goal of improved water
cooperation was largely realized in mid-2009 when Turkey’s Ministry of Environment and
Forestry and Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources signed a memorandum of understanding
252
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regarding national water use, development, and management, which also addressed potential
effects of climate change.257
Similarly, after Turkey’s establishment of an HSCC with Syria in early 2009, the two
states also signed four water-related memorandums of understanding.258 The first permits
Syria to construct a water pumping station on the Tigris, which Syria had previously
underutilized, to withdraw 1.25km3 of water.259 One remarkable aspect of this memorandum
is its clear indication of the continuing intention to reach a final agreement on allocation of
the rivers. Though this particular memo does not achieve this allocation (or even that
between Turkey and Syria alone on the Tigris), Article 6 begins, “Upon reaching a final
allocation agreement of the waters of Tigris-Euphrates Rivers among Turkey, Syria, and
Iraq…”260 thus illustrating the eventual intent to reach a more permanent agreement. The
second and third memorandums outlined Turkey and Syria’s planned coordination in face of
the worsening regional drought.261 Drought cooperation entailed extensive data, information,
and experience exchange, hydrologic studies, joint training programs, implementation of
monitoring and climate change mitigation measures, and rehabilitation of drought-resistant
plant species.262 The potential to include Iraq in establishment of a joint hydrological and
meteorological database is mentioned, but only “if deemed necessary by both parties.”263 The
final, and perhaps most notable Syrian-Turkish memorandum is the memo “for the
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construction of a joint dam on the Orontes River under the name ‘Friendship Dam,’”264 a
name that is indicative of warming relations in and of itself. Syria and Turkey would
collaborate on the construction, operation, and maintenance of the dam and its reservoir on
the long-contested Orontes River.265 The dam marks the first large-scale joint river
development project in the basin and provides a remarkable example of collaboration on
water issues.
Beyond the more tangible examples of agreements and memorandums of
understanding, the evolving rhetoric of leaders and high-profile ministers in the three riparian
states best illustrates the new millennium’s changing tides. At a Middle East Water Forum in
Jordan in 2008, Turkish Minister of Environment and Forestry, Veysel, Eroglu, said of
Turkey’s use of the Tigris and Euphrates, “War will not erupt in the Middle East due to
water…we do not perceive them as our rivers, and we wish to launch studies in line with
interests of countries from which these rivers also flow.”266 This comes in contrast to the
Turkish attitude during the second period, when a Turkish foreign minister suggested that
downstream demands to halt dam construction were an “interference in Turkey’s national
sovereignty”267 and then President Suleyman Demirel stated, “Turkey has the right to exploit
Euphrates water, because 90 percent of the water comes from Turkey.”268 The new view
clearly indicates a greater propensity on Turkey’s part to recognize alternate claims to the
Tigris and Euphrates water sources and reflects the high politics, cooperative nature of their
actions during this time period in contrast to the previous.
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Hydro-Contention: Simmering Just Beneath the Surface
Despite kinder words along with actual progress in communication, discourse, and
technical collaboration on the water issue, no formal treaty was signed among Turkey, Syria,
and Iraq during this time period and the three states did not reach a trilateral agreement on
water allocation. Turkey and Syria’s August 2001 Joint Communiqué on GAP and GOLD
did not contain any provisions regarding changes in the amount of water Turkey would
release as part of the agreement.269 The same can be said of all other agreements and
memorandums of understanding (whether bilateral or trilateral) that took place during this
time period. According to Kütük (2010), “Turkey continues to regard the Euphrates and
Tigris as transboundary rivers while Syria and Iraq see them as international watercourses
and demand an equal division of water.”270 As long as such rigid views of the river system
remain, it will be very difficult for cooperation to get beyond the kind of technical progress
made during this time period.
This chapter has illustrated the oscillation of the Tigris-Euphrates basin’s
hydropolitics over time. During the first period between the end of the First World War and
the late 1950s/early 1960s, water was a low politics issue, managed as a technical, domestic
policy concern, and subordinate to the three infant states’ newly forming political
relationships. When discussed or addressed in treaties delineating overall relations, water was
a cooperative issue among the three states, reaching the level of positive interaction on the
conflict-cooperation spectrum characterized by information exchange and meetings of
technical experts and bureaucrats. During the second time period, between 1960 and the turn
of the century in 2000, water rose to high politics, taking center stage on agendas of prime
269
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ministers, presidents, and foreign ministers and dealt with in state negotiations amidst critical
concerns of security and territorial integrity. In these years, water politics became conflictual,
with the liquid resource the subject of negative interaction ranging from verbal threats and
coercive politics to military mobilization and covert activities. In the third time period,
beginning at the start of the 21st century and extending until 2011, water remained a high
politics issue, regularly discussed among high-level officials from all three states and
certainly a foreign policy priority. However, unlike the previous period, water politics were
collaborative during these years and, although no final allocation treaty was signed, there
were instances of all types of positive engagement on the conflict-cooperation spectrum
including joint projects and codified agreements.
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Chapter 3: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s Politicized Hydropolitics
As the previous chapter evidenced, while Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics have
fluctuated between positive and negative interaction among the three riparian states over
time, the basin has not experienced either extreme on the conflict—cooperation spectrum.
This chapter examines the factors that have driven the oscillation in hydropolitics over time. I
show how scarcity, both real and perceived, drove water from low to high politics, and
illustrate how overarching diplomatic relations, the influence of external actors, economic
ties, and ethnic and ideological similarities and differences have shaped hydropolitics.
Low Politics and Cooperation in the Early Years
Water was the subject of largely low politics, positive interaction during the first time
period for two reasons: 1) the abundance of water (i.e. absence of both real and perceived
scarcity) allowed water to remain primarily a technical issue; and 2) an internal focus in all
three states kept their leaders focused on domestic issues, namely independence from
colonial powers, organization of new governments, forging of national identities, and internal
reform. The three states’ water cooperation was thus embedded within the establishment of
basic bilateral relationships among the three new states and reflected the relatively peaceful
tenor of the states’ political relationships during this time period.
Overflowing Rivers and Low Politics
Plentiful water to fulfill the needs of all three states and minimal upstream river
development kept water off the agendas of high level politicians and separate from traditional
security concerns. Without the threat of impending shortages or deprivation, water was an
issue of little concern for state leaders and negotiators preoccupied with other pressing postwar political concerns. Under the climatic conditions of this period, the Tigris and Euphrates
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contained more than adequate flow to meet the consumptive needs of all three states.271
Between the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the late 1950s, Turkey, the most water rich
of the three states, was using less than three percent of the Tigris and Euphrates water it
possessed, Syria just under ten percent, and Iraq around fifty percent.272 Dolatyar and Gray
(2000) characterize the rivers as having a “marked surplus of water…until the 1970s.”273 It is
thus clear that there was no “real” scarcity during this period that might concern leaders and
high-level officials within the three states.
Development of the upstream stretches of the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey and
Syria was also extremely minimal, thus also preventing any perception of water scarcity
within the riparian states. Placing water management in the hands of medium level
technocrats, advisors, and professionals, “the riparian countries were mainly concerned with
water supply for urban and rural populations”274 during this period. Populations and
economies were still relatively small, keeping demands for agriculture and electricity low275
and therefore requiring only the creation of small water management and irrigation projects
that had little impact on water quality or quantity and were often inefficient.276 According to
Shapland (1997), the views from Ankara, Damascus, and Baghdad during this period
maintained that “it was clear that there was more than enough [water] for all,”277 keeping
water low on the political agendas of the three riparians.
Iraq was the only state during the 1918-1960 time period that saw any substantial use
of water for more than basic consumptive purposes. As much of the nation is comprised of
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low-lying plains, Iraq faced a severe flooding problem. While Iraq was still under Ottoman
rule in the early 1900s, British hydrological engineer William Wilcox (hired by the Ottomans
to evaluate solutions to the flooding issue) recommended the construction of the al-Hindiya
Barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut Barrage on the Tigris, the Habbaniya, Tharthar, and
Naharavan irrigation projects, and what would become the Bekhme and Mosul Dams to
address the flooding problems and reinvigorate the small-scale irrigation of ancient
Mesopotamia.278 The development of these projects proceeded slowly while Iraq was
occupied by the British and after Iraqi independence in 1932. As the farthest downstream
state on both rivers, these actions only affected domestic Iraq. Although they have provided
the grounds upon which Iraq has claimed “historical rights” to the use of the basin since then,
Iraq’s hydro development projects for flood control and small-scale irrigation during this
time period were of very little concern to the two upstream powers, as they had no impact on
the water supply faced in Turkey and Syria. Thus, despite the presence of some hydrodevelopment, the fact that this development took place in the state farthest downstream on
both rivers—and that no state faced the constraints of either real or perceived scarcity—water
was not a primary issue in the states’ relations. With water a low politics concern, there was
“no exigency during that period in devising a regime framework for better management and
utilization of the waters in the basin”279 or in disputing river usage.
Looking Inwards
The cooperative water politics of this time period can largely be attributed to the
inward focus of the three countries during their early years. Throughout this era, the three
regimes were preoccupied with developing domestic economies and forming bureaucracies
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and basic governance institutions. Upon independence in 1932, Iraq faced numerous
problems left over from Ottoman and British rule. The state spent the first several years of
independence stabilizing its political system, quelling tribal fighting, and attempting to meet
the demands of local citizens for order, infrastructure, and food.280 Similarly, after it became
an independent nation at the end of WWI, Turkey turned inward to heal the land of its
wounds, and Atatürk focused on goals of rapidly consolidating, developing, and reforming
the Turkish state.281 After independence in 1941, Syria was left with little to no political
structure. The nation thus focused domestically to construct its state institutions282 and build
a cohesive nation free from French influence.
While this time period did see the beginnings of plans for the larger scale hydrodevelopment that would come to characterize the years between 1960 and 2000, these plans
reflected the three states’ internal focus. The states kept their plans for water management
and development to themselves,283 and, preoccupied as they were facing the internal
challenges of nationalist movements, bureaucracy formation, and power transitions from
colonials to national governments, they were not overly concerned about water plans being
made elsewhere. According to Kilbaroglu (2013), the three states’ burgeoning “national
management and allocation policies were like ‘black boxes,’”284 reflecting both the domestic
focus of state governments, and also indicating that the riparians’ future water demands were
not discussed during treaty negotiations.285 While the treaty clauses pertaining to water
clearly acknowledge the potential for future challenges of water allocation, the fact that
development schemes were not yet finished or shared during negotiations both made water
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agreements basic and positive and allowed water to be treated as just another technical issue
to be dealt with amidst state formation.
This is reflected in Turkey and Syria’s early hydro-development planning, which was
at this time managed by the relevant bureaucratic organs in each state (the Ministry of
Energy and Natural Resources in Turkey286 and the Ministry of Public Works and the
Ministry of the Euphrates Dam in Syria287). In 1936, Turkey established the “Administration
for Electricity Studies” to investigate the potential of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for
hydroelectric production.288 Extensive surveys and studies of the geologic and hydrologic
features of the basins were completed, resulting in plans for development projects along the
Twin Rivers and the creation of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in 1953 to manage water
development.289 However, despite “the Euphrates and Tigris rivers attract[ing] the attention
of planners in the early years of the Turkish Republic...the remoteness of the region and the
more pressing matters facing the young nation prevented action at that time.”290
Hydro-planning began as early as the 1920s in Syria, when the French recommended
the construction of a barrage on the Euphrates near Syria’s border with Turkey.291 However
the plan was not carried out then, nor upon reinvestigation after Syria gained independence in
1946.292 In the early 1950s, Syria saw some small-scale installation of pumps for irrigation,
but it was not until the 1960s that more widespread water development began in both Syria
and Turkey.293 The fact that the domestic projects during this first period both remained in
the planning phase and that the full extent of their future water demand was not yet known
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among the three riparians contributed to the perception of water abundance and facilitated
this period’s cooperative hydro-politics. Water negotiations’ place embedded within the
larger peace process and the establishment of basic diplomatic and economic relations also
illustrates how water politics followed the tenor of the three states’ broader political
relationships during this period.
The Conflictual High Politics of Century’s End
Water’s movement from the low politics of the first period to high politics in the
second was driven by the riparian states’ mutual realizations that the aggregate water demand
of the their unilateral development projects, all of which were deeply tied to national pride
and regime legitimacy in their respective states, exceeded the Twin Rivers’ supply. This
perceived scarcity, which threatened the potential for each state to develop and maintain
control of their diverse populations, made water a high politics issue. The conflictual water
politics of the time followed overarching trends of hostility among the three riparian states.
The specific factors that drove negative hydro-interactions in the second time period were:
the Hatay territorial dispute between Syria and Turkey, Cold War proxy politics, Alawi and
Sunni Ba’ath ideological differences and rivalries in Syria and Iraq, and Kurdish questions in
Turkey. With water in the arena of high politics, the existing political divides based on the
above factors made cooperative, positive hydro-interaction impossible. In this respect, water
once again followed politics in Tigris-Euphrates riparian relations.
Developing Dispute: Scarcity and the Politics of Development
While hydro-development projects were in their planning phases up until the 1950s,
the 1960s marked the beginning of their implementation and the first communication of the
plans’ water demands among riparians. It was during the 1960s JTC negotiations that the full
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extent of the three riparians’ competing claims to the rivers emerged.294 When the three
riparians brought forward their development projects’ water demands and found them to
outstrip river supply by more than 50 percent,295 water became, for the first time in the
Tigris-Euphrates basin, a scarce resource. With aggregate demand set to exceed supply, the
states were transformed from neighbors into competitors. The arrival of this perceived
scarcity—and attendant to it, the possibility of real scarcity down the line—created the
potential for conflict and dispute based on competing river claims, thus making water a
possible security concern and catapulting it into high politics.
The implication of this newly created scarcity was that one or more state(s) were
going to have to scale back their projects or alter their designs to make them less water
intensive. Because of intimate linkages between the riparian states’ massive hydrodevelopment projects and national pride, regime legitimacy, and economic success, the threat
that each state’s project posed to those of the other states went beyond the risk of incomplete
dams. In Turkey, “GAP [w]as a matter of national pride,” inspiring a kind of “obsessive
interest in it by some politicians, such as Turgut Özal and Suleyman Demirel.”296 With the
original plans laid out by the revered father of modern Turkey himself297 and designed to
unite the state’s ethnic groups by “turn[ing] Kurds into Turks,”298 GAP was inextricably
linked to Turkish national identity. In fact, each dam was inscribed with the motto of Turkish
nationalism (originally spoken by Atatürk himself), “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene,” meaning
“Happy is whoever says ‘I am a Turk.’”299 Similarly, in both Syria and Iraq, the “concept of
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Arab food security…dominated…strategic thinking during the 1980s.” 300 The economic
promise of hydro-development projects was an important source of legitimacy for the
regimes in both downstream states. In Syria, top officials asserted that “the Syrian Euphrates
Project is Syria’s future,”301 and both states’ ruling Ba’ath parties “placed…emphasis on the
development of rural areas and the organization of peasants as a political power base.”302 As
the three riparians’ Tigris and Euphrates development projects were tied to state unity and
regime survival, the moment that the extent of the three projects’ water demands were known
by all parties, each state’s project thus became a threat to not only the others’ development
plans but the very foundations of their states. In the words of Turkey’s President Suleyman
Demirel: “Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara
could claim their oil. This is a matter of sovereignty. We have a right to do anything we like.
The water resources are Turkey's, the oil resources are theirs. We don't say we share their oil
resources, and they can't say they share our water resources.”303 Such sentiments were
echoed and compounded in downstream states Syria and Iraq, where Turkey’s development
projects not only made their own development more challenging, but also gave Turkey a
“water weapon.” As such, water politics became high politics.
Water and Political Conflict in JTC Negotiations
Hatay Territorial Dispute
Despite the importance of water to all three regimes, otherwise politically strained
relationships drove negative hydropolitical interactions. Between Turkey and Syria, the
Hatay territorial dispute colored relations enough to prevent productive water cooperation. In
1939, France ceded the Syrian territory of Hatay (also known as Alexandretta or Iskenderun)
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to Turkey in exchange for Turkey’s entrance of the Second World War on the side of the
Allies.304 However, since independence, Syria refused to acknowledge the transfer of this
piece of territory and continued to show Hatay as a part of its own territory on Syrian
maps.305 At the same time, Turkey also claimed the region, and its people, as her own. The
Hatay territorial dispute became linked to Tigris-Euphrates water politics amidst disputes
over the Orontes River. The Orontes River runs from Syria into the Hatay province. During
the 1940s and 1950s, Syria, treating Hatay as her own, built small dams on the upper reaches
of the Orontes without consulting Turkey.306 When Turkish farmers claimed to be facing
water shortages in the early 1960s, Turkey attempted to link negotiations over the Orontes
with those for the Euphrates.307 Syria refused, continuing to ignore Turkey’s codified claim
to the province.308 Syria’s unwillingness to budge on the Hatay issue shaped Turkey’s
alacrity to negotiate and make concessions during the tripartite 1960s negotiations about the
Tigris-Euphrates. According to Barkey (1996), “Turkey’s insensitivity to downstream needs
and concerns is a by-product of traditionally bitter relations between the two states.”309 Thus,
the lack of cooperation on the issue of Tigris-Euphrates water during this period can be
partially attributed to the bilateral animosities stemming from Turkey and Syria’s decadesfestering Hatay territorial dispute.
Cold War Proxy Politics
The negative hydro-interaction among the three riparian states during this second
time period was also a result of conflictual predispositions based on historical ethnic
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animosities and Cold War political alignments. Even prior to the Second World War, Turkey
began to face west. Atatürk’s secular, modernizing reforms endeavored to “bring Turkey
closer culturally and politically to Europe.”310 Atatürk’s reforms, which emphasized
“Turkification” reflected the anti-Arab sentiments of the early 20th century Young Turk
movement in Turkey. According to Barkey (1996), “the extremist Turkification policies of
the Young Turks, in the form of harsh suppression of Arab language and culture, resulted in
an angry backlash that resonates even today in Turkey’s relations with the Arab world.”311
The Cold War only served to deepen these existing divides between Turkey and her Arab
neighbors downstream. In response to Soviet attempts to claim eastern Turkish territory and
waters following the Second World War,312 Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in 1952,313 finalizing “a strategic portion of the long-term plan to join
Europe and the West.”314
While Turkey was turned toward the West, Syria and Iraq were both facing East. In
1955, Syria opted to join a Soviet pact in return for $200 million in aid,315 and both Syria and
Iraq received Soviet assistance in hydro-development planning and construction.316 These
alliances not only served to deepen the East-West divide that existed along Syria and Iraq’s
northern borders with Turkey, but linked the larger geopolitical conflict to Tigris-Euphrates
hydropolitics. According to Dolatyar and Gray (2000), in the more conflictual water relations
of this time period, “what was critical was the East-West competition which came to graft
itself on the internal rivalries between the countries in the region. It was specifically in the
‘East-West context’ that the development of the Euphrates by the three riparian countries
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gained considerable strategic significance.”317 It was thus the conflictual political climate of
the Cold War that colored Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s water engagement during the second
period and hamstrung each state’s willingness to negotiate and compromise on water during
the negotiations that did take place. In this way, water relations followed political relations.
In the words of Allan (2002), the more conflictual Tigris-Euphrates politics in the latter half
of the 20th century were “examples of the international allocation and management of water
in the region being subordinate to the other priorities of international relations.”318
Political Rivalry and the 1975 Euphrates Crisis
Water’s mercy to the ebb and flow of the riparian states wider diplomatic relations
was again illustrated in the 1975 crisis between Iraq and Syria. While upon first look, Syria
and Iraq’s mutual threat of armed action appears to stem from Iraq’s animosity resulting from
water shortages after the filling of Syria’s Tabqa Dam reservoir, two factors indicate
otherwise. First, it is highly unlikely that the two states would have been so quick to mobilize
troops to their shared border if it was not for their regimes’ fierce, pre-existing rivalry and
ideological differences; and second, had the dispute truly centered on water, Iraq would
likely have placed equal blame on Turkey (whose filling of the Keban Dam reservoir at the
same time as Syria’s Tabqa contributed to the shortages Iraq experienced).
At the end of the First World War, the initial, relatively arbitrary, state divisions paid
little attention to ethnic or religious lines, creating the potential for internal ethnic or sectoral
conflict in the newly formed states. The institutionalization of these differences in Syrian and
Iraqi politics after independence pitted these two states against each other. In 1947, the
Syrian Ba’ath party was elected, and in 1954, a parallel Ba’athist movement arose in Iraq,319
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marking the beginning of an era in which, “the two Ba’ath regimes [were] in competition for
hegemony in the Arab world.”320 The Syrian Ba’ath party was Alawi (a Shia sect with ties to
the Shia minority in Iraq) and the Iraqi Ba’ath was Sunni.321 This religious divide,
competition to be the principal ideological voice in the Arab nationalist movements of the
region, and personal hatreds between the two Ba’athist regime leaders322 colored the water
tensions between these two states. According to Scheumann (2003), “The threat of war in the
mid-1970s was much more the result of political rivalries between the Syrian and Iraqi
branches of the Ba’ath Party and their competition over regional strength and authority than
struggles over water.”323
This was reflected in Syrian and Iraqi propaganda during the 1975 Euphrates crisis.
The two regime’s public acknowledgements of the water issue almost exclusively appeared
alongside rhetoric attacking the other’s “Arab legitimacy.”324 According to Kienle (1990),
Iraq “made it clear on several occasions that…it did not regard the [Euphrates] problem as
‘technical’ but as ‘political’, stemming from the two sides’ controversy over the defense of
Arab rights and interests.”325 A high ranking political figure of the Iraqi Ba’ath Regional
Command, Na’im Haddad, stated during the 1975 crisis,
Today…certain regimes, particularly the Syrian regime…cut off water from our masses…But we will
be victorious as we have been before. The masses of our Arab people in Syria will discover this
criminal design, which is neither new to us nor unexpected. The same Syrian regime adopted a
negative policy when the revolution in Iraq nationalized the monopolist oil companies and even
requested an increase in revenue from the oil flow.326

This statement illustrates the inseparability of Iraq and Syria’s water dispute from the two
states’ political rivalry. Tigris-Euphrates politics’ tendency to follow Iraq and Syria’s larger
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Ba’athist ideological and political antagonism is further evidenced by 1) the failure of this
official, and the Iraqi regime overall, to place any blame on Turkey for Iraq’s water
challenges;327 and 2) the fact that the Syrian and Iraqi regimes briefly united against Turkey
to oppose GAP in 1989, only after tempers between the two Ba’athist regimes had finally
cooled.328 Thus, while water certainly exacerbated existing tensions between Iraq and Syria
during the second time period, it was the overarching political climate of the times that
dictated the negative tenor of hydropolitics rather than vice versa.
Issue Linkage: Kurdish Militants and Euphrates Waters
During the last 20 years of the second time period (1980-2000), the linkage of the
water issue to that of PKK militancy in Turkey largely accounts for the contentious water
politics between Syria and Turkey. When the Turkish state was first formed at the heart of
the deceased Ottoman Empire, it came to contain coastal areas along the Mediterranean and
Black Sea (populated largely by ethnic Turks) and Anatolia: the mountainous, water-rich
region to the East where most considered themselves ethnically Kurdish. While these ethnic
differences had been nearly invisible under Ottoman rule—when demographic
differentiations were made on the basis of religion, rather than ethnicity329—Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk’s secularizing reforms after the First World War complimented a new attitude toward
ethnic identity. The 1924 constitution clearly articulated that the concepts of “citizen” and
“Turk” were one and the same, meaning for Kurds that the modern republic’s new
citizenship rights came “at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity.”330 Unable to
speak their own language and severely culturally repressed over the first three quarters of the
20th century, a budding Kurdish nationalism, with ties to Kurdish populations across the
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border in Syria and in northern Iraq, grew in Turkey’s southeast. In 1984, a branch of the
Kurdish nationalist movement, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) began fighting a guerilla
campaign against the Turkish government in an attempt to carve a Kurdish state out of
Southeastern Anatolia.331 The resulting pseudo-civil war between PKK militants and
government forces would come to claim more than 40,000 lives over the next 20 years.332
Given the extraordinary violence that resulted from Kurdish separatism in Turkey and
the threat it posed to the very foundations of Turkish national identity and territorial integrity,
this issue came to inhabit center stage in both Turkey’s domestic policy and regional
relations. Water policy is no exception. The linkage between the PKK issue and water was
originally a domestic phenomenon—a Turkish attempt to use hydro-development to
enfranchise its discontented Kurdish population. Given that “the Kurdish question is arguably
the most serious internal problem in the Turkish republic’s…history,”333 and identifying
economic underdevelopment as a principal factor in the political and social unrest that had
characterized Turkey’s Kurdish region throughout the late 20th century, Turkey’s
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), was conceived as a tool to improve regional stability,
discourage separatism, and counter the draw of the PKK.334 However, both GAP and the
PKK issue had implications beyond Turkey’s borders. According to Barkey (1996) and
James and Özdamar (2009), “Turkey’s relations with its neighbors [were] driven by the
exigencies of the [PKK] rebellion”335 and “internal relations between Turkish-Kurds and the
national government in Ankara…had direct influence on the relationship between Turkey
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and Syria.”336 Thus, given the gravity of the PKK predicament at home and the use of hydrodevelopment with downstream implications to combat it, Turkey’s decisions in TigrisEuphrates negotiations were influenced by concerns for the Kurdish issue within its borders.
The importance of GAP to containing the PKK made Turkey less willing to compromise or
scale back its project in negotiations with Syria and Iraq.
The PKK issue was also linked to Tigris-Euphrates riparian political dynamics as part
of Turkish efforts to externalize the PKK threat and thereby mobilize Turkish nationalism
against it. According to Brahma (2013), “The GAP case illustrates how water disputes may
come in ‘handy to politicians in personifying real or perceived outside threats in the domestic
context and in this way serve to unite the society against ‘foreign enemies’ and mobilize
support for the government.’”337 However, this linkage between the dispute over the
Euphrates and Turkey’s domestic Kurdish question provided Syria and Iraq with an
opportunity in their attempts to gain leverage against Turkey’s growing military, economic,
and hydro-hegemony that further entwined the two issues. Syria, which had been
intermittently supporting militants inside Turkey since the 1970s,338 recognized the
additional control GAP would give Turkey over her water resources, and by extension her
people, and thus had “an interest in aiding [the PKK] movement because one of the targets of
the guerilla group [was] the GAP.”339 Thus, “Damascus continued to pursue a policy which
had been enforced since the early 1970s and which had acquired greater importance because
of the Euphrates dispute. It consisted of supporting left-wing Turkish extremists, Kurdish
secessionists, and Armenian militants, but refusing to admit it.”340 Though Iraq had less of a
history of doing so, Saddam Hussein’s regime is rumored to have also supported the PKK’s
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activities in Turkey for a time during the Atatürk Dam crisis.341 Thus, Syrian and Iraqi efforts
to hamper full Turkish control of their water resources by supporting PKK militants within
Turkey compounded the linkage of the PKK issue to the water issue, and, by bringing water
politics intimately near Turkey’s primary security threat, contributed to the more conflictual
nature of water politics during the time that the two issues were linked.
While downstream riparian’s use of the PKK card as leverage to guarantee Tigris and
Euphrates flow may initially appear to be an example of water leading politics (i.e.
downstream states choosing to take political steps because of water concerns), there are two
factors that indicate otherwise. First, the water problem was only one among many festering
political disputes between Turkey and her downstream neighbors. Iraq and Syria’s support
for the PKK was related to an overarching political goal of offsetting Turkey’s growing
regional hegemony overall, and not only (or even primarily) hydro-hegemony. According to
Barkey (1996), “The use of the PKK card against Turkey by its neighbors with varying
degrees of intensity is a direct result of their need to balance Turkey’s potential threat to
them.” 342 While water problems were a piece of this, Syria and Iraq were “also motivated,
respectively, by irredentist claims over Alexandretta or by desire for revenge for Turkey’s
role during the Gulf Conflict.” 343 In this case, water was inseparable from other political
grievances that collectively provided adequate motivation for Syria and, to a lesser extent,
Iraq, to support the PKK. Secondly, as will be discussed in the following section, the rapid
warming of water relations directly following the resolution of the PKK issue between Syria
and Turkey indicates that water relations were once again at the mercy of other political
disputes. Given Syria’s additional motivations for supporting the PKK beyond simply water
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concerns, it is unlikely that the resolution of the water issue would have had similar
ameliorating impacts on the PKK issue. Thus, while water was a high politics, priority issue
for the riparian states during this time period, state actions were not motivated exclusively or
even primarily by water concerns. Rather, water once again played into the intricacies of the
states’ relationships overall and water politics were guided by the tenor of a broad variety of
often unrelated political and social concerns.
High Fives and High Hydropolitics
During the third time period, water remained in the realm of high politics due to both
continued unilateral water project development on the Twin Rivers (and thus a persistence of
perceived scarcity among riparians) and the onset of real scarcity with an extended drought in
Mesopotamia. Despite the first widespread shortages the basin has experienced since ancient
times,344 Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s water politics took on a remarkably cooperative character
during this time period, following several overarching political trends: 1) resolution of
historic disputes between Turkey and Syria, including the Hatay territorial disagreement and
the PKK issue; 2) growing EU-influence in Turkey, which triggered reorientations in both
Turkey’s overall foreign policy towards its neighbors and its water policy; and 3) changes in
leadership, trade dynamics, and views of the Kurds in all three states near the turn of the
century.
The High Politics of Drought
Perceived scarcity persisted into this period because, even during a time of overall
water collaboration, none of the three states was willing to scale back its development
projects.345 In spite of several financial stumbling blocks, Turkey has continued its
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construction of Ilisu Dam on the Tigris,346 much to Iraq’s displeasure. According to Iraq, the
dam would give Turkey the ability to decrease flow of the Tigris by 47 percent,347 damaging
Iraqi agriculture and the economy. Baghdad long protested the construction of Ilisu348 and
Iraqi author, Sami Hasan, was widely quoted for his inflammatory statements towards
Turkey and Syria’s continued dam construction.349 And yet, Iraq’s projects went on as well.
Under a newly appointed minister of water resources in 2004, Iraq had its own laundry list of
proposed hydro-development projects,350 including the massive Bakhmah, or “Dream” Dam
capable of restraining 11 billion square meters of water and producing 1500MW of
electricity.351 Like Turkey’s, Iraq’s projects were not void of critics. Gun Kut, water expert at
Istanbul’s Bogazici University, stated in response to Syria and Iraq’s continued allegation
that Turkish dam projects leave too little water for downstream, “Quit wasting the water and
there will be enough for everybody.”352 The ongoing hydro-development and continuing
condemnation in each state of others’ projects illustrates the persistence of perceived scarcity
in the basin. As projects continue, each state perceives the basin as becoming scarcer and
unable to meet the demand of all riparians. The fact that dam construction and water project
efficiency remained a key hydropolitical concern among riparians further exemplifies how
the perception of potential scarcity has helped to keep water a high politics issue.
The arrival of real scarcity during the latter half of the third time period also
contributed to water’s sustained place in high politics. In the six years between 2003 and
2009, the Tigris-Euphrates basin lost 117 million acre-feet of stored freshwater, representing
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the second fastest loss of water in a six year period of anywhere on the planet.353 Beginning
in 2006, summer rains failed to arrive four years in a row in the basin,354 leading NOAA to
release a study suggesting that, “the magnitude and frequency of the drying that has occurred
is too great to be explained by natural variability alone” and linking Fertile Crescent drought
to human-induced climate change.355 All three Tigris-Euphrates riparians were impacted by
regional scarcity. In Turkey, farmland dried up in the country’s Southeast356 and Istanbul and
Ankara instituted rationing programs in 2007 when drought brought reservoirs to five percent
capacity.357 Syria’s harvest in 2008 was 38 percent lower than prior to the drought,358 and by
2010, 160 villages had been abandoned and 800,000 citizens lost their livelihoods due to
drought.359 In Iraq, harvests fell by 51 percent,360 dust storms engulfed the country’s north,361
and two million people in the south faced drinking water and electricity shortages.362 Under
such conditions, with water refugees multiplying rapidly and urban dwellers demanding
improved supply, water remained high on both the domestic and foreign policy agendas of all
three states’ top officials.
Despite that physical conditions were ripe for water competition and conflict, high
water politics took on a cooperative nature during this period. In the words of Turkish
Foreign Minister Ahment Davutoğlu in a 2009 meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hosyhar
Zebari, “We know the situation is worsening in Iraq [and Syria] due to drought…we
understand the difficulties of the farmers in Basra. Their difficulties are our difficulties. Their
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future is our future. The expectations of the farmers in Iraq and Syria are equally important
for us.”363 Though Turkey and Syria repeatedly came close to war during the final 40 years
of the 20th century, the resolution of several issues that provided the sources of these disputes
during the second time period helps to explain the rapid improvement in riparian relations
and the tenor of the two states’ water politics during the third time period.
Healing Old Wounds in Turkey and Syria
Delinking Water from Syrian Support for PKK Militancy
After Turkey massed 10,000 troops along its mutual border with Syria in 1998, leaders of
the two states met in Adana, Turkey and signed the Adana Agreement. 364 With the Adana
Agreement, “Syria for the first time acknowledged that the PKK was a terrorist organization”
and agreed to “(1) expel PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria…(2) arrest PKK militants
active in Syria and uproot the PKK camps there; (3) cease providing weapons and logistical
and financial support to the PKK and forbid it to use Syrian soil…(4) extend cooperation
with Turkey against the PKK well into the future.” 365 It was less than a year after the Syrians
made good on these promises in 1999 that Turkey increased Euphrates flow into Syria.
Though Turkish officials cited technical reasons behind their choice—the need to reduce
pressure on dams in case of earthquakes—it is far more likely that the Syrian expulsion of
Öcalan, and the de-linking of the PKK and water issues between Turkey and Syria that
occurred as a result of the Adana Agreement, was the real reasoning behind Turkey’s good
water will.366 The warming water relations that resulted from the resolution of the PKK issue
at the end of the 20th century led Dohrmann and Hatem (2014) to assert, as I do, that “the
water issue cannot be identified as the leading source of tension and conflict between Turkey
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and Syria.”367 Given the critical importance of the PKK issue to Turkish domestic and
foreign policy, it comes as little surprise that resolution of this long-standing tension between
Turkey and Syria improved not only their overall political relations going into the 21st
century, but also prompted a softening of Turkey’s stance on the water issue and the
beginning of more positive hydro-interactions.
Settlement of the Hatay Dispute
Following trade negotiations between Turkish and Syrian leadership in late 2008, “the
Syrian government revised its official maps so as to remove the district around Iskandarun
from Syrian territory,”368 effectively acknowledging Hatay as a part of Turkey. Resolution of
this long-standing dispute between the two states directly influenced collaboration on the
water issue with their agreement to construct the Friendship Dam, the two states’ inaugural
shared water project. According to Kütük (2010), Syria’s “agreement to build a dam jointly
on the Orontes River on the border between Hatay and Syria in 2010 [was] an official seal on
Syria’s acceptance of Hatay as a part of Turkey.”369 If Syria still considered Hatay as her
own, there would be no “joint” water project, as the Friendship Dam would be in Syrian
territory alone. The fact that the project was funded and managed by both states in tandem
with one another not only illustrates Syrian acknowledgement of Hatay as Turkish territory
in practice, but also was made possible only through the resolution of this territorial dispute.
Here, warming water relations and high levels of cooperation arrived alongside solutions to
other, age-old political problems between the two states that had contributed to conflictual
hydropolitics in the past. When the political problems that had made both overall relations
and hydropolitics divisive were resolved, water politics improved along with the states’
367
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thawing attitudes. This again provides an example of water politics following larger political
relations in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin.
The EU in Turkey
Although evolving dynamics in all three states contributed to the more positive
riparian interactions of the third time period, as the farthest upstream state, Turkey’s
changing attitudes toward its downstream neighbors (largely as a result of EU influence)
played an important role in the betterment of diplomatic relations and hydro-engagement
during the third time period. While Turkey has been tying itself closer to Europe since
1959,370 it was officially granted candidate status for membership to the European Union
(EU) at the Helsinki Summit in 1999.371 Turkey thus entered the 21st century with a new
focus on meeting requirements for EU membership. This has taken two forms: 1) taking on a
role in the Middle East that, to a certain extent, serves European foreign policy needs; and 2)
implementing domestic reforms in issue areas extending from economic policy to human
rights in an effort to align Turkish policy with that of Europe.372 With regard to the former,
Turkey has, since the turn of the century, recognized that its greatest source of value to
Europe and much of the West comes from its ability to connect to and represent its (often
more troublesome) Middle Eastern neighbors. In other words, in the early 2000s, the Turkish
government could see that “the acceptance of Turkey’s placement in the West will be more
likely through the strengthening of Turkey’s links to the east.”373 Turkey thus enacted its
“zero problems with neighbors” policy374 in the early 2000s, which endeavored to improve
Turkish relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran with goals of both increasing Turkey’s regional
370

“EU and Turkey History.”
Ibid.; “EU-Turkey Relations.”
Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?”
373
Ibid., 7. Robins (2013) expresses similar sentiments on pg. 383 in his assertion, “The Turkish government could see that one very good chance of making
progress in its relations to the north lay in developing growing ties to the south.”
374
Robins, “Turkey’s ’Double Gravity’ Predicament: The Foreign Policy of a Newly Activist Power,” 389–390; Krajeski, “Taking Refuge: The Syrian
Revolution in Turkey,” 61; Salt, “Containing the ‘Arab Spring,’” 63.
371
372

Wasinger 84
influence and making it an even more appealing ally to Europe. Under the auspices of the
“zero problems” policy, which represented an “appropriation of EU norms and principles in
regional politics,”375 Turkey took on a “pre-emptive approach” to “eliminate all the problems
from her relations with her neighbors or at least minimize them as much as possible.”376
Water, as a “problem” among Turkey and her downstream neighbors, was not excluded from
this reorientation in Turkish foreign policy and hydropolitics thus became more cooperative
amidst improving relations overall. The “zero problems with neighbors” policy helps to
explain Turkey’s more active efforts to communicate and collaborate bilaterally with both
downstream neighbors on water issues during this time period, and, because of Turkey’s
preeminent place as hydro-hegemon of the basin as a whole, contributed to the more positive,
collaborative trilateral hydro-interactions in this period.
Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU also had a more direct, explicit impact on her
domestic and foreign water policy. As a potential EU member state, Turkey is responsible for
implementing the European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD).377 While the WFD
presents member states with a wide variety of responsibilities and initiatives ranging from
reducing pollution in urban wastewater to implementing accurate water pricing, at the heart
of the WFD is the requirement of water management on the scale of entire river basins, rather
than individual states.378 In other words, full implementation of the EU WFD mandates, “the
integration of industrial, agricultural, rural development, nature conservation and forestry
programmes at the river basin scale and, in many cases, transboundary collaboration.”379 In
the case of water bodies “that extend beyond the territory of the EU, the WFD obliges
Member states to endeavor to establish appropriate coordination with non-member states
375
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with a view to achieving the objectives of the Directive.”380 As an EU candidate state,
Turkey began implementation of WFD when it entered into force in October of 2000,381 and
thus, starting in that year, was “under an obligation to seek cooperative arrangements with
Iraq and Syria with the aim of achieving good…status as defined in the EU WFD.”382 Thus,
though the Turkish government has not released statements explicitly linking its increasingly
collaborative attitude toward its downstream neighbors to its requirements to fulfill the WFD,
it is nearly indisputable that Turkey’s need to work towards basin wide river management of
the Tigris and Euphrates (per EU directive) contributed to the more cooperative hydropolitics
that began at the turn of the century. With EU membership one of the Turkish
administration’s top priorities in the 21st century, Turkey’s softened stance with regard to the
Tigris and Euphrates and the state’s greater willingness to make concessions to, and
collaborate with, Syria and Iraq on the water issue was influenced by the mandates of the EU
WFD.
Secondary Factors in a Warming Political Climate: New Leaders, Kurds, and Trade
Beyond the resolution of long-standing disputes and EU influence in Turkey, new
leadership in Turkey and Syria also played an important role in improving relations.
Economic downturn and the US-led war in Iraq changed the regional dynamic considerably,
also creating opportunities for newly-forged alliances and new economic ties in the power
vacuum arising in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall. Under these overarching political and
economic conditions, the three states forged newly cooperative relationships based upon
personal affinities among leaders, opportunities for trade and economic growth, and changes
in each regimes’ relationship with its respective Kurdish population. Although rarely
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explicitly related to water, bilateral cooperation on all sides of the Tigris-Euphrates triangle
built up trust and a positive climate among the three states’ leadership, thus contributing to
the improving hydro-political relationships during the third time period.
Turkey and Syria
Between Turkey and Syria, the progress made on the Hatay, PKK, and water issues
was broadly motivated by changes in leadership in both states. Hafiz al-Assad, who took
power in Syria in 1970 and whose “crude interest in national and regime security”383
contributed to strained relations with the Turkish regime throughout the latter half of the 20th
century, passed away in 2000. According to Lawson (2013), “Improvements in relations
between Syria and Turkey accelerated during the months surrounding the death of President
Hafiz al-Assad.”384 Directly following Assad’s death, the two states revived a Joint
Economic Commission and began working to fully normalize relations,385 a process in which
the water project visits and river negotiations in the first years of the 21st century were part
and parcel. In 2002, the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey
completed the transformation of bilateral relations.386 Not only would the newly elected
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdğoan, come to call Syria’s new leader, President Bashar alAssad his “brother,”387 but the two states would harmonize their economic policies. Under
the economic component of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy, Turkey and
Syria signed a bilateral free trade agreement in 2007, and in 2009 removed visa requirements
for travel between the two states.388 The fact that Syria also saw Turkey as an increasingly
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powerful and important ally to have in the region389 undoubtedly contributed to her
willingness to negotiate and collaborate on the water issue. In addition to such personal and
economic ties between the two states—which certainly help to explain the increases in
interaction and more positive water rhetoric between Turkey and Syria during the third time
period—the two state’s newly harmonious Kurdish policies also played a role.
It has been suggested that Turkey found itself less head to head with Iraq than with
Syria over the water and PKK issues during the late 20th century because “Iraq and Turkey
have a…common interest: the suppression of Kurdish dissidents in their frontier areas.”390
This same common interest brought Turkey and Syria together during the third time period.
After Kurdish areas of northern Iraq were granted some autonomy during the US occupation
of Iraq,391 Syrian Kurds, “emboldened by the freedom they saw in Iraq,”392 erupted into
revolt in Syria’s north.393 Syria, which rapidly quashed these Kurdish uprisings,394 got a taste
of the challenge Turkey faced domestically in the PKK and found itself on common ground
with Turkey in managing ever-bolder Kurdish populations at home. It is highly likely that, as
the common Kurdish challenge mediated hostilities between Iraq and Turkey in previous
years, it helped to foster cooperation—or at the very least common understanding—between
Turkey and Syria during the 21st century. While it may not have directly impacted water
relations between the two states, the intimate connections between water and the Kurdish
issue suggests that a shared understanding of the Kurdish challenge, in addition to a strong
personal relationship between heads of state and growing trade linkages, helped to create the
environment for the 21st century’s more positive, cooperative water politics.
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Iraq and Turkey
While the creation of an autonomous region for Iraqi Kurds in the country’s north
initially concerned Turkey, which feared the impact this Kurdish success would have on
separatist Kurds within Turkey and their ability to operate out of a more independent
northern Iraq,395 ultimately “Post-Saddam Iraq offered new opportunities for the AKP to
seize…[which] would thrust Turkey into the wider region’s turbulent politics and make it a
player in Iraq’s future.”396 Soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq, Turkey, which maintained
goals of improving relations with its neighbors and “contribut[ing] to the emergence of a
stable environment in the region”397 came to the understanding that its “relations with
Baghdad now went through Erbil,”398 the capital of the autonomous Kurdish region in
northern Iraq, controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). With its sights set on
becoming an “energy corridor” for Europe399 Turkey dared not risk its chances to secure Iraqi
oil pipelines. Thus, despite its displeasure at Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, Turkey and
Iraq under post-Saddam leadership reestablished the “free flow of traffic and revenues”400
between the two states (which had been limited since the early 1990s) and implemented
lucrative business and oil deals with the KRG.401 These critically important economic ties,
which were intricately woven into Turkey’s goals of appealing to the European Union and
extending its regional influence402 and provided Iraq with much needed revenues during
unstable war years, helped keep water politics positive and cooperative. While water
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remained high on both states’ agendas, neither side dared take a potentially disputable stance
on the water issue at the expense of such important, profitable economic linkages.
Syria and Iraq
Similar changes in leadership and economic ties facilitated the more cooperative
hydropolitics between Syria and Iraq during the third time period. After Bashar al-Assad took
over his father’s place at Syria’s helm, “there were perceptible efforts to turn over a new leaf
in his relations with Iraq under Saddam Hussein.”403 These efforts were manifested in the
two states’ agreements to phase out duties and establish oil flow in 2001,404 and in their
negotiations about the Euphrates during 2000.405 While the US invasion of Iraq changed the
dynamic—bringing Syria’s remaining anti-Western sentiments into sharp relief close to
home406—Syria kept up its efforts to maintain relations with Iraq, “welcome[ing] successive
delegations of Iraqi notables as 2003 passed and [doing] their best to reestablish commercial
and transportation links to post-war Iraq.”407 The economic ties between Syria and Iraq
continued to grow throughout the first decade of the 21st century.408 While these ties alone
are not enough to fully explain the improved water relations between these two states, they
created critical interdependencies that helped facilitate the positive hydropolitical interactions
of the time.
Following Hydropolitics
While it is clear from the above descriptions of 21st century changes that water
relations followed the tenor of wider politics, this fact is perhaps best illustrated by the “19
August Crisis” between Iraq and Syria. On August 19, 2009, a Shiite attack in Baghdad
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killed 101 civilians and wounded 600 more.409 Iraq blamed Syria for the bombing and the
issue shot to the “top of the political agenda.”410 Though Turkey, Iran, and the Arab League
rushed to mediate so as to prevent the crisis from eroding the progress made in Syria and
Iraq’s political, economic, and water relations during the new millennium, the two
downstream Tigris-Euphrates states’ water relationship suffered.411 Syria and Iraq’s “crisis of
confidence” blighted the water meeting that was to take place two weeks after the attack and
hamstrung Turkey’s hopes for an integrated regional market to help ease energy and water
tension.412 Though this brief crisis did not entirely, or even substantially, undermine water
cooperation during the third period, it highlights both the peace’s fragility and the enduring
link between the political atmosphere and the hydropolitical climate of the times. Despite the
ample progress made during the first decade of the 21st century, water politics ultimately
proved to still be susceptible to conflictual flares in other issue realms or relations overall.
Patterns of Water Conflict and Cooperation
This study of the oscillation of Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics synthesizes scholarship
from the environmental security field focused on the question of resource cooperation and
conflict. This research substantiates and further clarifies the conditions under which we can
expect to see more cooperative or conflictual relationships among actors sharing a water
resource. The preceding analysis of the ups and downs of water engagement in the TigrisEuphrates Basin demonstrates which aspects of the prevalent political, economic, and social
circumstances in interstate relations tend to engender the more positive, cooperative
hydropolitical outcomes seen in the first and third time periods, or encourage negative,
conflictual hydropolitics, as in the second. Based on this analysis, it seems unlikely that any
409
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transboundary water resource can be the subject of perfectly cooperative or entirely
conflictual hydropolitics at all times. Rather, we can expect interaction to oscillate along the
conflict-cooperation spectrum over time, only periodically reaching or remaining at either
extreme.
As water politics fluctuate between positive and negative engagement over time, it
seems that the best determinant of the tenor of hydropolitical relations at any one moment is
the current diplomatic climate. Throughout all three time periods, we see water “following”
ties or divisions among the three riparian states. Whether the outcome was more
collaborative or conflictual in each time period, hydropolitics improved when relations
improved in general and worsened when they deteriorated. The most clear-cut example of
this is issue linkage. In the Tigris-Euphrates case, hydropolitics tended to become conflictual
when linked to other key issues of national security and sovereignty, such as the Kurdish
issue and Hatay dispute between Turkey and Syria, but improved dramatically and quickly
after such linked disputes were resolved. As such, it is clear that one of the most reliable
means to achieve more cooperative hydropolitics is the resolution of issues to which they
have been linked.
The influence of an external actor can also be a very powerful force for engendering
more cooperative hydropolitics, to the extent to which a third party prioritizes improved
relations among riparian states. The opportunity for Turkey to gain membership to the EU
had a remarkably positive impact on Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics, as Turkey’s efforts to
comply with the EU’s vision and requirements resulted in both a new concern for Turkey’s
national image in its neighborhood and measures towards implementing EU-mandated basinwide river management. This EU influence ultimately drove a reorientation of Turkey’s
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domestic and foreign water policy in the long-term that positively impacted basin-wide
hydropolitics. We also see external actors having a positive impact on short-term dispute
resolution, as the 1975 crisis between Iraq and Syria would likely have resulted in war if it
were not for Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia mediation.413 However, when more cooperative
politics are not a focus of an external actor influencing one or more states sharing a
transboundary water body, third parties can have a negative impact. Such was seen when the
Tigris-Euphrates riparians associated themselves with opposing superpowers during the Cold
War and experienced conflictual hydropolitics while the international politics of these
external actors influenced regional relations.
Commitment from high-level officials and economic interdependencies also emerge
as factors helpful for achieving cooperative hydropolitics. During the third period, water
relations became markedly more positive in light of the fast friendship between Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and their
prioritization of the water issue. The existence of political will for cooperation in the
upstream state especially encourages positive hydropolitics, as illustrated by the
extraordinary impact of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy in improving both
political and water relations with its downstream neighbors. Growing trade linkages on all
three sides of the Tigris-Euphrates triangle during the third, and to some extent also the first,
period were similarly important in creating the climate for more cooperative hydropolitics at
these times.
The factor that emerges as most often espousing negative hydropolitical interactions
is ethnic/ideological politics. When states or groups see themselves as divided along
irreconcilable ethnic or ideological differences, or when such dynamics come into play in
413

I discuss this in Chapter 2 on page 46.

Wasinger 93
water disputes, conflictual hydropolitics emerge or become more difficult to resolve. In the
Tigris-Euphrates case, the Alawi and Sunni Ba’ath differences in Syria and Iraq provide
evidence for such a conclusion, as does the Kurdish issue between Syria and Turkey and the
echoes of Arab vs. Turk politics that remained in Turkey’s relationships with her downstream
neighbors during the Cold War. That being said, when states find themselves on the same
side of an ethnic dispute, positive hydropolitics can result, as seen in improvements of
Turkey-Syria water relations in the third period as Syria came to share Turkey’s challenges in
facing an uppity domestic Kurdish population.
When connected to the water issue, nationalistic tendencies, concerns about
sovereignty, and economic modernization can cause water relations take on a conflictual
tone. As seen during the second period, when hydro-development projects become
intertwined with national identity and regime legitimacy, states’ expressed displeasure at
another’s water management can become a much broader affront and cause water politics to
take on a competitive, nationalistic, and ultimately conflictual, tone. In the Tigris-Euphrates
case, all three states saw their development projects for the Twin Rivers as key to
maintaining control over their territory and uniting their populations, making them
dramatically less willing to compromise in negotiations when it became clear that scalebacks were necessary.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this case study is that regarding the role of
scarcity. While scarcity is generally thought of as a factor that encourages conflictual water
relations, the third period shows how a cooperative existing political context can override the
potential competition of real and perceived scarcity to augment negative hydropolitics. In
fact, this study illustrates that although scarcity creates the potential for conflict over water
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resources by engendering competition (or at least the perception thereof) among riparians,
rather than necessarily translating into conflictual hydropolitics, scarcity simply puts water
on the agendas of presidents and prime ministers and makes it a high politics, foreign policy
concern rather than solely the subject of domestic, technical management. While in some
cases, scarcity can prompt negative water relations, as is seen during the second period when
perceived scarcity and competing river claims contribute to conflictual hydropolitics, it can
also engender interactions on the cooperative side of the spectrum when other political,
economic, and social relations among states are positive. This analysis thus contributes to
more nuanced understandings how environmental conditions and existing relationships
among states interact to influence hydropolitics and vice versa.
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Conclusion
While the history of the Tigris-Euphrates improves our understanding of the specific
factors that drive interstate water politics, a look at the basin since 2011 complicates and adds
dimension and nuance to this picture, illustrating both the relevance of the preceding analysis
and the limits of such a framework.
Hydropolitics and Syria in Crisis
2011 started off a promising year for Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics. January
heralded both an announcement that Turkish planners intended to build 18 cross-border dams
in concert with neighbors Iraq, Syria, Iran, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Greece, with the specific
intent of “disprov[ing] the water wars thesis.”414 And in February, construction began for
Turkey and Syria’s much-anticipated Friendship Dam on the Orontes.415 However, these
encouraging, positive dynamics were not to last. The Syrian government’s brutal crackdowns
against graffiti artists in the country’s south that sparked widespread domestic uprising in
March 2011416 brought the Syrian regime’s legitimacy into question and proved catastrophic
for the Tigris-Euphrates riparians’ cooperative hydropolitics of the previous ten years.
At the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, Turkey initially encouraged Assad to pursue
reform.417 When it became clear that this path was a dead end,418 Erdoğan proclaimed that it
was time for Assad “to go.”419 Turkey quickly reversed its friendly policies toward Syria,
suspending dialogue and trade,420 imposing steep sanctions on the Syrian regime, and
welcoming both Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters and the Syrian National Council (Syrian
414
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governing coalition, supported by the West) inside Turkish borders. 421 In response, the
Syrian regime renewed support for PKK activities inside Turkey.422
Water relations initially seemed more resistant to alienation than these other political
links between the Turkish and Syrian states. As of 2012, the construction of the Friendship
Dam was still a go despite the more general ‘end of Friendship’ between the two regimes in
the final months of 2011.423 Similarly, Turkey initially decided against the possibility of
cutting off water flow to Syria as part of the international sanctions regime against the
increasingly unpopular Assad.424 However, a worsening drought at home425 and mounting
chaos and violence in Syria426 prompted Turkey to begin to strangle Euphrates flow in May
2014. By the end of June 2014, Turkey had closed its dam gates altogether,427 for the first
time reducing Euphrates flow to a trickle.
Water relations between Syria and Iraq have remained largely unchanged and
somewhat neutral amidst the crisis in Syria. Primarily due to sectarian similarities between
Syria’s ruling party and new leadership in Iraq,428 Iraq is standing by Syria, opposing
sanctions, and providing an “economic lifeline” for the country.429 Under these conditions,
water relations have neither dramatically improved nor deteriorated in the last five years. In
contrast, Turkey and Iraq’s hydropolitical relationship has suffered amidst poor relations
between Turkish leadership and Iraq’s new Shia regime.430 Following the theme of ethnic
and ideological differences contributing to more conflictual water relations, Foreign Minister
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Ahmet Davutoğlu, representing majority-Sunni Turkey, and Iraqi Shia spiritual leader,
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, reportedly squabbled over the water issue at a meeting in November
2013, prompting al-Sistani to suggest that U.N arbitration was necessary for any peaceful
resolution of the Tigris-Euphrates dispute.431
ISIS: The New Kid on the River Bank
In addition to new developments in interstate hydropolitics, Tigris-Euphrates
dynamics since 2011 have been influenced by the rise and growing power of non-state actors.
While there are a wide variety of groups at play in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—including the
PKK, FSA, al-Nusra Front, KRG, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, and more—by far the most
critical to this discussion is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS’ debut in TigrisEuphrates hydropolitics has been equally as negative for the potential of cooperative basin
management as it has been conceptually interesting for scholarly understanding of the role of
water in conflict. In its brutal bid to construct an Islamic caliphate over the area of modern
Iraq and Syria, water has functioned as one of the principle weapons in ISIS’s arsenal and
control over the twin Mesopotamian rivers and associated infrastructure has been critical for
the group’s territorial gains and state-building efforts.
ISIS’s movement through Iraq and Syria has followed the paths of the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, the group prioritizing control of riverside cities and dams.432 Not only does
following the water give ISIS access to a large number of settlements in Syria and Iraq (and
the life resource itself in an increasingly dry region), but it also provides the group with two
measures of control over Iraqi and Syrian citizenry: 1) with command of water resources, the
threat of turning off the taps and restricting access makes water a potent weapon of coercion;
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and 2) taking control of water infrastructure and the responsibility of supplying water for
local populations provides a measure of legitimacy to a non-state group attempting to gain
state-like authority.433 In a particularly potent example of ISIS’ use of water for political
ends, the group rapidly closed the massive gates of the Iraqi Fallujah Dam on the Euphrates
in April of 2014, causing water to overflow above and flooding 200 square miles of farmland
and villages, destroying homes, and ruining crops. This aggressive manipulation of water
both forced the retreat of Iraqi forces gaining ground on ISIS in Fallujah and left thousands
of Shiites downstream without water.434 Having previously voiced intentions to deprive
Shiite regions of water,435 this appears to be a targeted use of water in a coercive, conflictual
manner, motivated by sectarian differences.436
Clearly, through its own actions, ISIS is a potent threat to cooperative resolution of
the Tigris and Euphrates water disputes. As a non-state actor, ISIS is not bound or obligated
by any of the existing treaties and agreements in the basin, nor does the group seem
concerned about accountability to states or organizations of the international system. ISIS
also provides a danger to the potential for more permanent hydro-peace through the reactions
the group elicits from states. It has been suggested that Turkey’s choice to close the gates of
the Atatürk Dam and stop the flow the Euphrates in June 2014 was in part a politically
motivated effort to deprive ISIS of a key resource in the Caliphate’s capital, Raqqa, and
thereby debilitate the group’s functional capacity.437 Though Turkey’s actions successfully
put pressure on ISIS, prompting threats from the group that “God willing if they [the Turkish
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government] don’t open it [the dam], we’ll open it from Istanbul,”438 it has also had
extremely damaging effects on water and electricity supply for civilians in Syria and Iraq.439
Thus,both in its own actions impacting water management and those it elicits from riparian
states, ISIS has had a negative impact on Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics.
A Peaceful Future?
This brief analysis of more recent events in the Tigris-Euphrates basin illustrates that
many conclusions drawn from my inquiry into basin politics from 1918-2010 hold true,
despite dramatic changes in political circumstances in Syria and the addition of new, nonstate actors to the mix. In both interstate interaction and ISIS’ hydropolitics, sectarian and
ideological differences once again emerge as important driving factors for water politics.
New sectarian divisions between political leadership in Turkey and Syria precipitate these
states’ deteriorating water relations, and ISIS’ hydro-aggression is somewhat motivated by its
declared battle against Shiites. Similarly, we again see water following patterns of trade and
relations among heads of state as worsening water relations complement the decline of
economic ties and friendships among leaders in Turkey and Syria. Water undoubtedly
remains a high politics issue, as evidenced by its discussion in key meetings between Turkish
and Iraqi leadership such as Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. And once again,
real scarcity (in the form of drought in Turkey and the actual shutting off of Euphrates flow
from Turkey into Syria) maintains water’s place in high politics.
In the last five years, water has also largely conformed to the trend established in my
previous analysis: hydropolitics reflect the character of overarching political trends. This is
exemplified by the deterioration of water relations between Turkey and both Syria and Iraq
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amidst declining diplomatic and economic relationships related to the Arab Spring in Syria
and the rise of Shia leadership in Iraq. The continuation of construction of the Friendship
Dam into 2012 despite Turkey and Syria’s divergence, however, illustrates a stickiness to
hydropolitics that was not apparent in previous time periods. Though it is unclear from media
reports whether dam construction continued past 2012 as bilateral relations further
deteriorated, the simple fact that it extended beyond the official “end of friendship” between
Turkey and Syria is significant. This, combined with the Turkish regime’s somewhat
surprising willingness to draw attention to the dam as a mark of continued positive
hydropolitics amidst its simultaneous criticisms of the Asssad regime, may illustrate
something of a “partial institutionalization of water cooperation”440 not previously seen in the
basin. Perhaps, if given the chance to further develop, such institutionalization could enable
cooperative hydropolitics to resist oscillations in wider political relations. Unfortunately, it
seems that Turkey’s 2014 choice to cut off water to Syria, combined with the rise of ISIS,
make such promising cooperation unlikely at present.
For its part, ISIS introduces a new and volatile dynamic into the Tigris-Euphrates
mix. Non-state actors like ISIS (i.e. powerful extremist groups) often do not see themselves
as bound by international norms or traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution in the
current international system (such as treaties, informal agreements, or obligations to
neighboring states). They thus may be less susceptible or subject to influence by external
actors that might otherwise be able to positively influence hydropolitics (such as the UN, EU,
etc.). The very fact that ISIS is attempting to conquer the territory of Iraq and Syria means
that the group also threatens the systems of bureaucratic organization and water management
that are important in encouraging and implementing cooperative agreements over water.
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Combined with these discouraging facts, the extensive uncertainty surrounding the current
and future control of the Tigris and Euphrates that ISIS brings to the table makes effective
water management under such circumstances immensely difficult and positive water politics
elusive.
The picture painted here of the present conditions in the Tigris-Euphrates basin is not
very pretty or promising for the prospects of positive, cooperarive hydropolitics in coming
years. The fact that we have seen water politics follow broader trends of relations in a region
where, historically, politics have been both remarkably violent and exceptionally volatile
does not bode well for the future of water politics in the basin. In addition to this worrisome
dynamic, climate change is only making water scarcer in this region.441 While this may not
directly translate into conflictual hydropolitics, the combination of such environmental
circumstances with the present political climate supplies the tinder and sparks for more
widespread dispute and tension relating to water resources in the future.
Despite this somewhat pessimistic final note, this paper contributes to our
understandings of the complex interconnectivities between a basin’s diplomatic, economic,
and social circumstances and its water politics. I have illustrated how Tigris-Euphrates
hydropolitcs have fluctuated from low politics and cooperative interactions to high politics
conflictual engagement and then remained in high politics but become more collaborative
over the course of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. I argue that the driving force for
such oscillations stems from broad fluctuations in diplomatic relations, influence of external
actors, economic ties, and the saliency of ethnic and ideological similarities and differences,
thus reflecting a tendency of water politics to follow overarching political trends. My
analysis of the role of scarcity in hydropolitical relationships as the driver for water’s
441
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movement from low to high politics, but not necessarily towards conflict, adds to scholarly
understandings of how tensions over water develop and the necessary conditions for more
cooperative resolution of such disputes. While recent developments in the region and the
growing impacts of climate change have altered the dynamics of the Tigris-Euphrates basin
in the last five years, if the lessons of the past are any guide, the exigencies created by such
changes will likely contribute to some more positive, cooperative hydropolitical trends and
some more negative and conflictual. Although the future of the Tigris-Euphrates basin is
uncertain, there is no doubt that just as the Twin Rivers first raised the question of the
potential for water to spark wars 4,500 years ago, these rivers will once again be center stage
in the 21st century’s answers to that question.
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